

TECHNICAL COOPERATION AND STAKEHOLDER OWNERSHIP



Shekhar Singh

The photograph on the cover is of a seemingly idyllic environmental setting for a village. This village is located in a valley below the road connecting Corbett National Park and Nainital, in Uttarakhand, and was photographed in the early 1990s by the author.

The Lady slipper orchids depicted on the back cover were photographed by the author in the mid 1970s, in Meghalaya, where they were being protected by the local people in the wild.

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List of Acronyms

| | |
|---------------|--|
| <i>CDI</i> | <i>Capacity Development Initiative (of the UNDP)</i> |
| <i>CIDA</i> | <i>Canadian International Development Agency</i> |
| <i>DANIDA</i> | <i>Danish International Development Agency</i> |
| <i>DFID</i> | <i>Department for International Development (of the United Kingdom Government)</i> |
| <i>GEF</i> | <i>Global Environment Facility</i> |
| <i>GTZ</i> | <i>Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (German aid agency)</i> |
| <i>IMF</i> | <i>International Monetary Fund</i> |
| <i>NGO</i> | <i>Non-Governmental Organization</i> |
| <i>OECD</i> | <i>Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development</i> |
| <i>PRSP</i> | <i>Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper</i> |
| <i>RTC</i> | <i>Reforming Technical Cooperation</i> |
| <i>SIDA</i> | <i>Swedish International Development Agency</i> |
| <i>SWAP</i> | <i>Sector Wide Approach</i> |
| <i>TA</i> | <i>Technical Assistance</i> |
| <i>TC</i> | <i>Technical Cooperation</i> |
| <i>TCI</i> | <i>Technical Cooperation Initiative</i> |
| <i>UNDAF</i> | <i>United Nations Development Assistance Framework</i> |
| <i>UNDP</i> | <i>United Nations Development Program</i> |
| <i>UNICEF</i> | <i>United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund</i> |
| <i>USAID</i> | <i>United States Agency for International Aid</i> |

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. Objectives of this study and report:

- To explore the unexploited potential for moving to more local ownership.
- To 'classify' TC modalities, execution and funding arrangements in terms of their "ownership- friendliness," process (and long-term) orientation and participatory nature.
- To scrutinize TC modalities, taking a vision of full ownership as the "default setting" and probing under which conditions less "ownership-oriented" modalities can be justified.

2. Ownership essentially implies empowerment and responsibility (somewhat similar though not identical to the legal notion of rights and obligations). In the context of TCIs, the term ownership is used to denote a "sense of ownership", applicable to processes or entities of which the "owner" is a part, rather than the narrower sense in which one "owns" a possession.

3. The stakeholders include:

- Intended direct beneficiaries (IDBs), mainly the people of recipient countries
- Intended indirect beneficiaries (IIBs), typically the people and governments of the donor countries, and the world population in general - if TCIs help make the world a better place.
- Unintended beneficiaries (UBs), including intermediaries, consultants, agencies and concerns supplying goods and services for the TCI.
- Unintended direct losers (UDLs), mainly those inadvertently and adversely affected
- Intended direct losers (IDLs), mainly those in recipient countries whose illegitimate power or gains are sought to

be curbed through a TCI, for example the corrupt, or exploitative individuals and agencies.

- Unintended indirect losers (UILs), including those who pay an opportunity cost
4. Historically, there was minimal or inappropriate ownership of TCIs by stakeholders other than the donors. Though the level of national ownership differed from donor to donor and from country to country, even from "project" to project, overall it was inadequate and inappropriate.
 5. There were constraints to moving towards greater local ownership, both on the part of the donor and on the part of national governments. These included, on the part of the donor, an inability, partly because of domestic accountability requirements, or unwillingness to relinquish control, a suspicion of national governments and sometimes a preoccupation with results rather than processes. The importance to deliver, urgently, some goods and services sometimes overshadowed the importance of promoting self-reliance.
 6. On the part of the national governments, there was inadequate capacity, a lack of interest, inability to control corruption or ensure efficient implementation, unwillingness to assume the risks involved, suspicion of the donor and, often, a non-democratic process of decision-making. Many of these constraints still remain though efforts are now ongoing to overcome them.
 7. Recently there has been a shift with most donors working towards increased involvement of national stakeholders in the planning and implementation of TCIs:
 - The program or sector wide approach as opposed to the project approach: this allows donors to support national plans rather than setting up initiatives isolated from the national planning process. It also gives greater temporal and programmatic flexibility and allows focus on a complete sector rather than just a particular problem.

- *Process consultations, that facilitate ongoing discussions between the donors and national governments and, on occasion, other stakeholders. These include techniques like search conferences, open space technology, appreciative enquiry, conflict resolution mechanisms and various approaches to organizational self-assessment.*
 - *E-learning and consultations. These include email based consultations, as has been done as a part of the RTC initiative, and studies, surveys and networks.*
 - *New types of resource transfer mechanisms like SWAPs, PRSPs, TA pooling, UNDAF models, etc.*
 - *Involving a greater proportion of national consultants and experts and, where appropriate, developing south-south cooperation.*
 - *Including other stakeholders, for example national universities, institutes, NGOs and the private sector into TCI planning and implementation.*
 - *Strengthening internal monitoring and evaluation systems, including the involvement of neutral national monitors from the NGO or private sectors.*
 - *Greater focus on capacity development.*
 - *Some efforts at dealing with local communities, either directly or through NGOs, but not through the government.*
8. *In most cases, these innovations are too new to really determine how far they have been successful in broadening ownership. However, some examples, both positive and negative, are available. It is obvious that these modalities, though helpful cannot, on their own, achieve more appropriate ownership. One critical requirement is the inclination and commitment on the part of the powerful stakeholders: on the part of the donors to include national governments and on the part of national governments to include other stakeholders.*

9. Another critical requirement is the presence of adequate and appropriate capacity among donors and national stakeholders to expand ownership.
10. The objectives of the TCI also determine the relevance and importance of local ownership. TCIs that are aimed at emergency relief or the urgent delivery of goods and services are less inclined to focus on local ownership than those that are focused on local capacity development and the resultant self sufficiency and sustainability. There is often a trade off to be made between the immediacy of the required results and the process of delivering these results.
11. Similarly, the local conditions also often determine the feasibility of establishing local ownership. Where nation states are strong, well organized and democratic, it is more feasible to promote local ownership than where this is not the case.
12. Finally, how ownership oriented a TCI is depends on the motivations of the donor. Where TCIs are established to fulfill the political and/or commercial needs of donor countries or national government, or have a need to show quick, demonstrable results, local ownership becomes difficult. However, where they are focused on supporting nation states and local communities to meet their own social and economic aspirations in their own way, then local ownership becomes a strong ally.
13. *Possible future directions*
 - Work at including other stakeholders into the TCI planning and implementation process and making them partners and owners. These include local beneficiary communities, especially the women and the young, but also those who stand to directly or indirectly lose from the TCI. However, efforts should be made to do this with the national and local governments and not by bypassing them.
 - Where this is not possible, because of national government reluctance or other reasons, as an interim there is a need

to have a periodic (perhaps yearly) exercise, not linked to any specific TCI or donor, to hear unheard voices. This could be done by using national NGOs, academics and other institutions and the findings of such an exercise could inform both donors and governments.

- Where even this is not possible, it is still important to carry out not only a cost benefit analysis of the proposed TCI but also a class benefit analysis or a social audit. This should be aimed at ensuring that the TCI promotes equity and adequately safeguards the interests of historically ignored stakeholders like women and children.
- As more stakeholders are brought on board, there would be a need to set up strong conflict resolution mechanisms.
- While pursuing the changeover from projects to programs or sector wide approaches, where appropriate, there must also be a further shift from sector wide approaches to integrated and multi-sectoral area approach.
- Such an approach would also necessitate a decentralization of control and flexibility in decision-making. However, adequate safeguards, like the infusion of transparency, need to be established in order to ensure that decentralization and flexibility does not lead to distortions due to political pressures.
- The setting up of area trust funds to give the required flexibility and local ownership for funds flow would also be a desirable innovation.
- In the final analysis, the objective should be to promote accountability of the government and the donor to the people rather than the current model where the government is accountable to the donor.
- Each TCI should be preceded by a capacity needs assessment and, where adequate capacity for designing and implementing a CDI do not exist, capacity development should be the first task of a TCI.

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INTRODUCTION

Objectives

According to the Terms of Reference, the objectives of this study were:

- 1. To explore the unexploited potential for moving to more local ownership.*
- 2. To 'classify' Technical Cooperation (TC) modalities, execution and funding arrangements in terms of their "ownership- friendliness, " process (and long-term) orientation and participatory nature.*
- 3. To scrutinize TC modalities, taking a vision of full ownership as the "default setting" and probing under which conditions less "ownership-oriented" modalities can be justified.*

Method

This study is based on an assessment of the secondary literature available on the subject (listed in the references and bibliography), and on an assessment of 132 TCIs, mostly relating to natural resource management, initiated or completed in the 1990s (listed at annex 1). The initial conceptual framework was also extensively discussed through an e-mail discussion set up by the UNDP and an earlier draft was circulated to peer reviewers for comments and also discussed in a workshop in Turin, where many donor representatives and experts made presentations. Finally, extensive discussions were held with various categories of stakeholders in Asia, Europe and Africa.

Chapter 1 - STAKEHOLDERS AND OWNERSHIP

This study has two assumptions that seemingly go beyond its terms of reference. First, it does not consider the total “transfer” of ownership, even if it is from donors to governments and from governments to communities, as the desirable objective. It works with the assumption that the desired end is an appropriate level and type of ownership by all stakeholders. By doing this, it seeks to recognize the responsibility all the people of the world have to each other and, indeed, to all living things. It refuses to accept the right of any “stakeholder” to abdicate his or her responsibility and, thereby, it seeks to synthesize, rather than polarize, stakeholders. A possible profile of appropriate levels and types of ownership, for each of the different categories of stakeholders, is described below. However, these profiles must be dynamic, and need to change with time and circumstances.

It also recognizes that TC modalities¹ cannot by themselves promote ownership, but improper ones can often retard it. What makes the critical difference is stakeholder inclination and commitment to move towards a wider and more appropriate ownership, and the systemic, institutional and individual capacity to bring about and take over such ownership.

1.1 What is Ownership?

Ownership essentially implies empowerment and responsibility (somewhat similar though not identical to the legal notion of rights and obligations). In the context of TCIs², the term ownership is used to denote a “sense of ownership”, applicable

¹ The modality of a TCI is understood to be its structure and the processes involved in its conception, design, implementation and evaluation. Ordinarily, the subject matter of a TCI is not seen to be a part of its modality, though it might influence the choice of modalities.

² For the purposes of this study, Technical Cooperation Initiatives (TCIs) are understood to be projects, programs, or other type of initiatives that seek to help develop capacities inherent in systems, institutions and individuals through a sharing of expertise and/or know-how. Strictly speaking, cooperation suggests that there is a two-way transfer and that neither party is the sole recipient or the sole donor. However, in reality, most often it is primarily a one-way transfer of “know how” or “capacity” from the “donor” to the “recipient”, though invariably the recipients also end up contributing financially to such initiatives. Therefore, for it to be technical cooperation, just a transfer of financial resources from one government (or agency) to another, without any sharing (or transfer) of knowledge, expertise, or skills is not enough.

to processes or entities of which the “owner” is a part³, rather than the narrower sense in which one “owns” a possession.⁴

The level of responsibility inherent in ownership is not necessarily and at all times in direct proportion to the level of empowerment. Donors, for example, might have a very high level of responsibility towards a TCI, especially towards facilitating the empowerment of other stakeholders, but might not need to be significantly empowered towards the overall design and implementation of the TCI. Similarly, local communities might need to be significantly empowered to make decisions but might have a much lesser level of responsibility than the government to make the TCI run properly. Though, on the face of it this might seem contradictory, in actual fact it is essential while expanding ownership to stagger the expansion of responsibility while pushing ahead with empowerment. This, in some senses, is the way that change can be best managed⁵.

It seems obvious that universal stakeholder ownership is easier for TCIs that have no losers (if that is possible) or where the “losers” are very few in comparison to the “winners”. It is relatively difficult where the opposite is true. Also, where the benefits are immediate and focused and the costs are long-term and dispersed, ownership potential is much greater than where it is the other way round. Similarly, where a TCI is culturally and socially appropriate, and easy to understand, justify and accept, it is ownership friendly, as opposed to the

³ This is akin to the “sense of ownership” one has towards one’s country and unlike owning an object or possession, like a car.

⁴ Brautigam (2000) quotes Johnson and Wasty (1993), who use an alternate definition of “ownership” that is based on four dimensions: [1] locus of initiative, [2] level of intellectual conviction among key policymakers, [3] actions and speeches in support of the reforms by top leadership, and [4] visible efforts toward consensus-building among various constituencies (4-5). Each dimension of ownership was rated according to four-level scale intended to capture the intensity of ownership. For example, at the highest ownership level for ‘locus of initiative’, ‘the initiative for formulating and implementing the adjustment program was clearly the borrower’s.’ At the lowest level, ‘the program was prepared by the Bank and funding extended, despite governmental disagreement and reluctance to implement some aspects of the program’(4).

⁵ This is also the way in which a democracy works, where the people are empowered but responsibility is delegated to the government. The government, of course, is finally answerable to the people.

complicated, obtuse and inappropriate one. And, finally, where the process of stakeholder empowerment has started right from the beginning and the design and implementation of the TCI is not only an outcome of such empowerment but also a consensus of views and opinions of the various stakeholders, than there is much greater potential for wide-based ownership.

The path to ownership is necessarily through stakeholder participation and involvement, and through building stakeholder consensus. However, stakeholder participation or involvement in a process does not by itself necessarily imply or lead to ownership. Neither does stakeholder consensus.

It is easier to invoke participation than to empower, and easier to empower than to build a consensus. However, empowerment without consensus can lead to chaos. And if consensus, along with participation and empowerment is to result in stakeholders taking responsibility for the process, then it has to be a genuine consensus. A forced or artificial consensus often results in the abdication of responsibility, with stakeholders retaining the right to interfere and criticize but refusing to take any responsibility for the process or the outcome.⁶

Ownership, therefore, is the acceptance of responsibility through the process of stakeholder participation, empowerment and consensus.

1.2 Who are the Stakeholders?

Stakeholders can be defined as individuals, institutions, groups and communities that are directly or indirectly (and positively or adversely) affected by the TCI.

One way of classifying stakeholders is to divide them into external (non-national) and internal (national)

⁶ This, of course, poses a problem when “unpopular” or “hard” decisions need to be taken. Whereas, in the short term and in emergencies, there might be merit in taking such decisions, sustainability lies in doing all that is necessary to forge genuine consensus, though not unanimity, among critical stakeholders even about such decisions. Another approach is to have a consensus about the fundamental principles involved and then take hard decisions that follow from such principles, even if they are unpopular. This is a necessary to safeguard the interests of a group that is in a numerical minority. However, transparency and the credibility of the decision makers go a long way in making such decisions “stick”.

stakeholders. However, perhaps a more useful classification is to distinguish between:

- *Intended direct beneficiaries (IDBs)*: those for whose benefit the TCI is designed and implemented, including the national, sub-national and local recipient governments, but especially the recipient population.
- *Intended indirect beneficiaries (IIBs)*, typically the people and governments of the donor countries, and the world population in general - if TCIs help make the world a better place.
- *Unintended beneficiaries (UBs)*, including intermediaries, consultants, agencies and enterprises supplying goods and services for the TCI. Also “rent seekers” among both the donors and the recipients.
- *Intended direct losers (IDLs)*, mainly those in recipient countries whose illegitimate power or gains are sought to be curbed through a TCI, for example the corrupt or exploitative individuals and agencies.
- *Unintended direct losers (UDLs)*, mainly those inadvertently and adversely affected by the project, like those displaced by irrigation projects or those whose access to natural resources is curbed due to conservation projects. These are the innocent victims.
- *Unintended indirect losers (UILs)*, including those who pay an opportunity cost, because the money their government is using to fund TCIs is, consequently, unavailable to meet their own felt needs. Also included are those possible recipients who were passed over in favor of the actual recipients.

1.3 Advantages of Expanded Ownership

Expanded ownership, especially ownership by recipient local communities and governments, brings with it many advantages. These can be classified into five broad categories.

- *Political advantage*
- *Epistemological advantage*

- *Psychological advantage*
- *Implementation Advantage*
- *Advantage of sustainability*

a) Political Advantage

With the emergence of self-determination, self-reliance and decentralized and participatory democracy as widely acclaimed values, the ownership of TCIs by local stakeholders, especially local communities, brings immense political prestige to donors.

On the other hand, centralized or donor controlled TCIs have earned various bilateral and multilateral agencies a reputation of being manipulative and undemocratic. It has opened them up to charges of pursuing their own hidden agendas under the guise of TCIs. This has not only tarnished their image abroad but also, over time, weakened support in their own constituencies.

The broadening of the ownership base also allows for the formation of strategic alliances that could significantly strengthen TCI design and implementation and help neutralize disruptive political and commercial interests. The involvement of beneficiary communities could help counteract self-serving tendencies both in donors and in governments. The involvement of potential losers could similarly ensure that neither donors nor governments cut costs at their expense and worked hard to establish the benefits and optimality of the initiative. The involvement of the beneficiary private sector could not only weaken other disruptive commercial influences but also help neutralize regressive influences of the donors and governments.

b) Epistemological Advantage

Local involvement is usually the best and often the only way to ensure that TCIs are designed and operated in a manner that is appropriate to local realities. The detailed knowledge of the local conditions within which TCIs have to function, especially micro level peculiarities and variations, cannot be adequately captured without the involvement of local stakeholders. Often

Absurdities of Centralized Planning

A typical example was that of a health sector project supported by one of the bilateral donors, in the mid 1980s, in South India. One objective was to set up sub-health centers in rural areas to service the needs of rural populations. These centers were run by multi-purpose health workers, invariably women, who were expected to live at the center and be available for medical help at all times of the day or night and especially in the late evenings, when most of the villagers had returned from their fields.

During the first review of the project it was observed that the centers were coming up in the main villages, where the upper caste villagers lived, but were relatively inaccessible to the lower caste (and usually poorer) people, who lived in "colonies" that were some distance from the main village. Consequently, a decision was taken at the "highest level" that all future centers must be equidistant from both the main village and the colony. The second review discovered that, consequent to this decision, the centers were now coming up in isolated areas, between the two inhabitations, sometimes a kilometer or more away from each and, therefore, people were not inclined to visit them. Again a high level decision was taken that the remaining centers must now be constructed at that end of the main village that was nearest to the colony. Unfortunately, even at this stage they did not think it fit to consult the concerned villagers and the health workers.

However, the planners obviously did not know that villages, in that part of the country, invariably had a *shamshan ghat* (cremation ground) at one end and a toddy (local liquor) shop at the other. The female health workers, consequently, refused to live in these centers for, after sunset, they feared either "spirited" men or spirits, depending

TCIs designed with the best of intentions and the highest levels of professionalism do not deliver because local realities are not adequately understood or appropriately weighed and taken into consideration. What is acceptable and what is not, what works and what does not, and what is the best way of making things work, are questions that are best answered by people who live and work in the host environment and have a major direct stake in the initiative. Outsiders, national or expatriate, however

experienced they might be, very rarely have such detailed and updated knowledge. Local communities also have a wealth of traditional knowledge, which is mostly ignored mainly because few non locals understand or appreciate its value.

c) Psychological Advantage

An important goal for all interventions should be to promote national self-reliance. However, TCIs that are not appropriately owned by national stakeholders promote the mentality of dependence on donors. Many countries and

societies are plagued by such a mentality and have lost both the ability and the will to take responsibility for their own situation and problems.

d) Implementation Advantage

A TCI that is owned by local stakeholders has two types of implementation advantages. First, it is likely to have a greater level of commitment and responsibility on the part of the national government and the affected community. Local stakeholders, if supportive of the initiative, can often pressure the government for early and effective implementation. Where the local stakeholders are informed about and committed to the initiative, they can also play an important role in informally monitoring its implementation and providing feedback, thereby promoting efficiency. This increased efficiency and commitment on the part of the stakeholders also saves costs and makes the TCI more economical.

On the other hand, an initiative that is owned by all major local stakeholders is much more likely not to face major opposition and obstruction from within and outside the government. Many TCIs get inordinately delayed and even abandoned because of strident and persistent public protests against its objectives, impacts and methods. These protests are not only in-country but are often supported by international NGOs, the press and even groups within donor countries.

e) Advantage of Sustainability

Where an initiative is not appropriately owned, it only exists as long as the donor is around and financing it. The moment the donor disappears, it collapses and its gains, if any, are lost forever. Also, as "project funds" dry up, local communities refuse to shoulder the financial burden of sustaining or carrying forward the gains. This happens when the objectives and/or the methods of the TCI are such that major in-country stakeholders do not subscribe to them. This also happens when nations and their people start believing that the meeting of even their own felt needs is the responsibility of the donor, and not their own. In some cases, the establishment of aggressive TCIs can destroy the initiative and incentive of communities,

and even governments, to continue to do even what little they were doing on their own to solve their problems. Over time, a sort of transference takes place and what was initially a local agenda starts being looked at as a donor agenda. In perverse cases, after a donor has left, there is even a tendency to destroy what has been achieved for it is seen as the agenda of a donor who is no longer present to protect “its own interests”.

1.4 Ownership Profile

Very often, national ownership is understood to mean ownership by national governments. Sometimes, this is restricted to a formal endorsement by the national government to the TCI. In any case, governments do not always speak for all their people. Therefore, it is important to hear and involve all the various categories of stakeholders (listed at 1.2 above).

Perhaps the most important stakeholders are those communities directly affected by the TCI. Among those directly affected, it is not only the intended beneficiaries that one needs to hear, involve and get the acceptance of, even more important are the unintended direct losers.

An inclusive process of formulating and implementing a TCI is as important for making TCIs ownership friendly, as are its objectives and strategies. Therefore, it is important to involve all stakeholders from the start, whether they are potentially supportive or in opposition. However, the weight that each stakeholder's views and opinions should have differs from issue to issue and stakeholder to stakeholder.

Each category of stakeholders should have an appropriate ownership profile⁷. Some elements of such ownership profiles are discussed below.

⁷ The notion of ownership involves, to varying degrees, the notion of control. Therefore, as different stakeholders have different ownership profiles, they also have different types and levels of control. Similarly, ownership also involves both being accountable and being accountable to – again different types of accountability for different stakeholders.

a) Donor Agencies and Countries

The appropriate notion of ownership for donor agencies⁸ and donor countries could include:

- A responsibility to ensure that the people of recipient countries are appropriately involved and empowered, especially in the process of TCI design and implementation.*
- A commitment to participate in this process, when invited, but a responsibility to ensure that participation is aimed at helping partner nations to identify their own needs, formulate their own objectives and decide upon what are the best methods for them. It could extend to advising the countries and bringing to their notice experiences and options.*
- The obligation to help set up appropriate mechanisms for facilitating stakeholder ownership, where the capacity or inclination to do so is missing in host countries.*
- The responsibility to help governments achieve their stated and explicit agendas, in so far as these were democratically arrived at and were not dictated by any specific interest, including donors.*
- The responsibility to ensure that the implementing authorities are meaningfully accountable to their own people. Where such a process is not in position, the donor has the obligation to insist on it being set up and, till it is, to take on some of the monitoring responsibilities.*
- The obligation to see through what it has started and not leave things half done, unless it is clearly in the interest of the partner country to not pursue it further.*

⁸ Donor agencies also have obligations to the governments and people of their country and to the international community. However, in so far as these come in the way of their obligations to the recipient country, their legitimacy is questionable. For example, where the need to be answerable to their governments, or to cater to the inclination of their larger constituencies, leads them to force TCI objectives or modalities on to partner countries.

- The obligation to share some of its wealth and expertise with those less fortunate.

b) Governments

For the intended government beneficiaries the appropriate notion of ownership would include:

- The right to insist that donors can only come in on the basis of national consensus, as described below.
- A responsibility to ensure that TCIs are received and utilized in a manner that is in consonance with the will of its people and their expressed needs and priorities, and their preferred methods for addressing them.
- Consequently, the responsibility to ensure that adequate mechanisms exist and are used to involve and empower the people, especially the historically disempowered ones, including women.
- Also, the obligation to ensure that fair and transparent methods of conflict resolution are developed and applied, where necessary.
- The responsibility to ensure that the people, in order to make the relevant decisions, have the required information and support that they need.
- The responsibility to ensure that the implementation of the TCI is done in a manner that ensures accountability to stakeholders, especially the local ones.
- Where governments do not have the capacity to fulfill any of these responsibilities, the donor has the responsibility to help develop such a capacity. In the meantime, it can take temporary responsibility for ensuring that these functions are performed, till indigenous capacity is developed.

c) Beneficiary Communities

For the intended local-community beneficiaries the appropriate notion of ownership would include:

- The right to be involved and empowered in the process of decision making that are likely to affect their lives (positively or negatively), the weight of their opinion being in direct proportion to the impact that the TCI will have on them.
- The right to have their needs addressed in the manner and with the priority that they themselves determine or has been determined as a part of a consensus to which they were a party.
- The obligation to take responsibility for the TCI by monitoring it and doing all that is necessary and possible to ensure its success.
- The responsibility to ensure that the capacities developed through the TCI are not frittered away once the TCI is over.

d) Those Adversely Affected

The appropriate notion of ownership for those adversely affected would include:

- The right to participate in the decision-making and conflict-resolution processes.
- The right to suggest, and have appropriately considered, alternatives that could minimize their losses.
- For those who are the innocent victims, the right to receive appropriate compensation/rehabilitation for their loss such that:
 - It does not impoverish them economically, socially and culturally.
 - It leaves them at least no worse off than before.
 - It ensures that their compensation is at least at the same ratio to their loss as the initiative's benefits are to its costs.

Chapter 2 - OWNERSHIP FRIENDLY MODALITIES

To move towards more appropriate TCI ownership, some of the modalities that need to be established are discussed below. There are, nevertheless, many real and imagined constraints to fuller ownership. These are discussed in detail in Chapter 3.

2.1 For Stakeholder Participation and Involvement

TCI design and implementation modalities must be such that they encourage and facilitate appropriate levels of participation. Some of the tasks such modalities must facilitate include:

a) Identifying Stakeholders

Though the relevant categories of stakeholders have been detailed in 1.2 above, the actual identification of who falls into each of the defined categories is not always easy. There is a special problem at the design stage, when the various parameters of a proposed TCI are not yet clear and, therefore, the direct losers and beneficiaries cannot be identified with any level of certainty. However, any participatory exercise becomes meaningless without the involvement of these critical stakeholders⁹.

Even where the scope of the proposed TCI has become clear, the identification of those directly affected is not a simple one. Depending on the objectives and methodology proposed, backward and forward linkages have to be worked out to see whom the TCI would affect.

GENDER SENSITIVITY

Most TCIs, though paying lip service to gender sensitivity, do not have any modalities especially designed to involve women in the planning and implementation and for making the design sensitive to women's concerns. The problem starts with the collection of data which are gender insensitive or, at best, gender neutral. This leads to an understanding of problems

⁹ See UNDP 1998, p14, for an alternate but less satisfactory classification of stakeholders that totally leaves out those adversely affected.

and solutions that are from a male perspective and are, therefore, either not optimal or exclude women as potential beneficiaries. In fact, in some cases, such insensitivity results in making the lot of women even worse than it was before the TCI.

A study of various dams and irrigation systems, for example, done for the World Commission on Dams, brought out that water distribution systems were often designed to make water available to farmers at night. This enabled systems to use the surplus power available at that time. However, in many societies, women farmers were not able to venture out into the fields at night and, therefore, not only did they not get the benefits of the irrigation system but, in comparison to their male colleagues, became economically worse off (Singh and Banerji 2002).

Further breaking down stakeholder categories and ensuring that all the groups within each category get a voice is critical. It is especially important to clearly identify the disempowered sections of each category of stakeholders, including women, indigenous people, and those economically disadvantaged.

b) Disseminating Appropriate Information

Participation cannot be meaningful unless it is informed participation. Therefore, prior to involving stakeholders they must each be given access to relevant data in a comprehensible manner. Where there are illiterate stakeholder groups, this is a special challenge.

Also, in order to make the discussions meaningful, it is not enough to provide information on just the proposed TCI, alternative designs and alternatives to the TCI must also be analyzed and the information disseminated.

c) Invoking Stakeholder Participation

To get the critical stakeholders to participate appropriately is not an easy task. Many stakeholders might be unable or unwilling to participate, or just disinterested in the process. TCI modalities must deal with each of these types of situations.

Stakeholders are sometimes unable to participate because they do not have the time or even the minimal resources required. They could also be unable because social structures do not allow them to participate. This is especially true of the most critical of stakeholders, those historically disempowered, especially women and weaker segments of the society. Stakeholders might be unwilling to participate because they are cynical about the value of such participation, about the usefulness of the proposed TCI or about TCIs in general, or suspicious of the donor or the government agencies involved. They might also be unwilling to participate if they feel inadequate or unprepared.

There is a wise Indian saying which, loosely translated, reads:

"You cannot keep your mouth and your mind open at the same time!"

Disinterest and apathy can have many reasons, and can arise out of cynicism or a sense of hopelessness and a belief that nothing and no one is ever going to help them.

d) For Facilitating Stakeholder Participation.

Having identified all the stakeholders, disseminated relevant information and enthused them to participate, the actual modalities of participation are still very challenging. In many TCIs, especially those that are intended to have widespread impacts, the number of stakeholders can be very large. Besides, their geographical spread can also be huge. How does one effectively disseminate information and engage such a large and spread out stakeholder community?

It is important to distinguish, in such cases, between those stakeholders who would be directly affected by the proposed TCI and those who would only be indirectly affected (see classification in 1.2 above). Whereas for those that are only indirectly affected, and their number would invariably be much larger, it might be enough to be reactive, for those that are directly affected it is essential to be pro-active.

In other words, for the larger group of indirectly affected stakeholders it might be appropriate to use the printed and electronic mass media to disseminate information, and acceptable to await their response. The donors and other

project proponents can afford to be reactive to their comments, suggestions and objections, without having to actually seek them out. Of course, modalities designed to get them interested must be activated. Also, for special interest groups among them, like experts, influential groups and individuals, the press, etc., a more direct approach might be prudent.

On the other hand, directly affected stakeholders would have to be approached more vigorously and efforts would have to be made to ensure their participation and not just await it. Here again, the literate and educated ones can be approached through written material, letters, e-mails and even linked up to internet discussion groups. However, for many of the less educated, especially rural stakeholders, direct contact would have to be made through public meetings and perhaps through traditional systems of information dissemination and interaction.

In any case, the focus would have to be on those who are directly affected and, among them, those who are ordinarily not heard, including women and other disempowered sections, and those likely to be adversely affected.

Reaching out to all stakeholders is only the first challenge. Ensuring a free, frank, informed and constructive dialogue itself poses many challenges. Fortunately, many tried and tested methods are available today (for example the participatory rural appraisal approach) to break through the many linguistic and cultural barriers that inhibit a constructive and open exchange of views. These need to form a part of the participation modalities. Special care has to be taken to ensure the process of involvement is culturally appropriate.

For such a process to be successful, appropriate human resources are required. It is usually far difficult for outsiders, foreigners or nationals, to access the community. Therefore, local intermediaries have to be identified and trained for the task. They must have the ability to listen and to encourage others to think and talk. They must have the ability to hear and understand everything with an open mind and to keep

their own preconceptions out of the way. However, as local intermediaries might carry with them local biases, a system of checks and balances has to be put in position.

2.2 For Stakeholder Empowerment

Stakeholder participation by itself, however extensive and successful, does not lead to empowerment. Very often stakeholder consultations are just that: stakeholders are consulted and their views noted, but then the consultants and managers get on with designing and implementing the TCI. This is especially so when, as very often happens, things are first decided and only then put up for stakeholder consideration.

Such a process, apart from not leading to empowerment, also dissuades stakeholders from further participating in this or other similar processes. Therefore, the dangers of consultation are two fold if it does not lead to empowerment: not only is there no commitment for the specific TCI but also there is stakeholder resistance to future consultations.

Participation is a bit like antibiotics. If you do not do the full course, stakeholders can develop an "immunity" to participation.

For participation to lead to empowerment, the rights of each stakeholder have to be made explicit and respected from the very beginning of the process (for a possible list of rights, see 1.4 above). They must know where their views count and to what extent, and this must be demonstrable. They must also feel empowered to participate in the process of conflict resolution and consensus building and feel confident that the consensus so arrived at would determine the nature of the TCI.

a) Decentralized Decision Making

Stakeholder empowerment is possible only if the process of decision-making is decentralized and flexible. Flexible and decentralized decision making also allows for easy mid-term corrections in the process of TCI implementation and, thereby, makes the TCI responsive to changing local perceptions and needs.

DECENTRALIZED PLANNING

Till recently, most donors, including the World Bank, had "task managers" located in their headquarters who essentially ran the TCI through remote control. All action plans and any deviation from "The Project Document" had to be approved by this task manager. Expenditure was specified in "The Project Document" and deviation was extremely arduous and time consuming. In effect there was no flexibility for local level managers. Even today, though many donors have decentralized control to country offices, effective decentralization to the field is largely missing. Besides, there are contradictions between the procedural requirements of the donor and the imperatives of decentralized decision-making. A good example of this is the planning process for the World Bank Indian Forestry Research, Extension and Education Project (FREEP) and the GEF/World Bank India Ecodevelopment Project.

The World Bank wanted the planning process to be a participatory one. However, they also required that the project proposal document be complete in all respects and list every activity that was to be taken up in every village or location, along with the detailed costs. This created an interesting dilemma. The Indian team in-charge of planning for the project argued that it was neither fair nor efficient to develop such a detailed proposal at this stage. Essentially their argument was that it was insensitive to go into village after village and use the villagers time to sit with them and discuss, prioritize and collectively decide on what they wanted the most, when it was not known when the project would commence and, indeed, whether it would be approved at all. It was like taking your child to a toy shop, asking her to choose what she wanted and after she had enthusiastically done so and made painful decisions about what to choose over what, tell her that we might come back after some years and buy her what she wanted, in case the money came through!

Also, there was the problem that the local conditions might change in the interim, while the project proposal was being

deliberated upon and the activities and priorities determined today might no longer be relevant by the time the project was initiated.

The World Bank, on the other hand, seemed to require that before a project was approved, all activities and expenditures must be detailed. Besides, if a village-by-village exercise was not done, it might be difficult to justify the budget proposed for the project, as it would have no empirical basis.

After prolonged discussion the Bank finally accepted the concept of an indicative plan, which was to be prepared on the basis of detailed and participatory planning exercises in a small sample of the villages. The overall budget would be based on the extrapolation of per-village costs, as determined from this sample of villages. The project would, therefore, have an eco-development fund that would not be tied down to specific activities in specific villages at a specific cost. What would be stipulated is the method to be used in determining the activities to be taken up in each village and their cost. (Singh and Sharma 2001)

b) Transparency

Transparency at all stages of the TCI: design, implementation and evaluation, is essential to win public trust. It is also an important precondition to informed public participation and an effective method of ensuring probity. Where TCIs are designed and implemented in secrecy. Most intended beneficiaries and other concerned people never get to know what has been planned, why, and how it is to be implemented. Therefore, they cannot demand accountability from their governments and other institutions.

Therefore, TCI modalities must include effective measures to make all information public. Many methods are available today, including the use of the media and internet, and by organizing public hearings for the affected communities. All these need to be appropriately used to ensure that those who are affected by a TCI know exactly what to expect and are in a position to object if something less or something different is delivered.

PUBLIC HEARINGS

Sometimes the best solutions to social problems emerge from the society itself. This is what happened in the Indian state of Rajasthan where the villagers, fed up with corruption in the Panchayat (local government) system, decided to do something about it. Under the banner of the *Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan* (MKSS-Labourer, Farmer Empowerment Society) they started demanding copies of bills, vouchers and muster rolls relating to expenditure incurred by the panchayats. Because of a sympathetic bureaucrat, the vouchers and muster rolls for the few village panchayats were made available to the villagers. The MKSS then organized *jan sunwais* (public hearings) between December 1994 and April, 1995, where these muster rolls and vouchers were read out to the whole village. The results were startling. In village after village they discovered that many of the works that were supposed to have been undertaken in the village and for which vouchers existed, had in reality never been carried out. They also discovered that many of the names on the muster rolls were false, some even belonging to fictitious characters or to individuals long dead.

The news of this spread rapidly and more and more villagers started demanding access to muster rolls and vouchers. There was, understandably, panic among the panchayat functionaries who protested and the Gram Sevaks (village level government functionaries) of Ajmer District even went on strike. However, this only strengthened the determination of the local people to demand and get a right to information about their money. The slogan they adopted was: *Hamare Paise, Hamara Hisab* (our money, our accounts). The movement has spread to day to many parts of the country and some states have even enacted laws in support of the demands of the people, legally ensuring their access to such information. (Singh 2001)

c) Answerability

The openness with which TCIs are planned and implemented and their responsiveness and answerability to stakeholders, have a profound impact on their ownership friendliness. A critical precondition for the active participation of stakeholders in a TCI is that the TCI management must be answerable in some effective way to the stakeholders, especially to those directly affected. Transparency, as discussed above, is one method of ensuring broad answerability. However, whereas that might be appropriate for most categories of stakeholders, for those directly affected, some more pro-active form of answerability has to be institutionalized.

d) Monitoring and Evaluation

The involvement of stakeholders, especially the local stakeholders, in the process of monitoring and evaluation, is an important modality for ensuring answerability and empowerment. It is also important to share the findings of such monitoring and evaluation with all the stakeholders.

MONITORING AND EVALUATION

A survey of ongoing and completed TCIs, done as a part of this study, revealed that apart from internal monitoring systems in TCIs, most donor agencies had their own systems of monitoring TCI progress and achievements. Many of them also evaluated the initiative after completion. For this purpose, they either sent out "review missions" or hired consultants.

The independence and depth of monitoring and evaluation differed from donor to donor. The UNDP, for example, carried out a detailed and independent mid-term monitoring and a similarly detailed and independent post-completion evaluation. The World Bank, on the other hand, monitored and evaluated its TCIs primarily through its internal Operations Evaluation Department. These appeared to be far less detailed, except for a few selected TCIs. Similarly, though the UNDP evaluations were supposed to be public documents, the World Bank evaluation reports were internal documents,

not ordinarily available to the public. However, neither seemed to involve the local stakeholders in the process of monitoring and evaluation.

2.3 For Building Stakeholder Consensus

As more voices are heard, more discordant notes are sounded. Some discord might be illegitimate or even vicious, but others have a legitimate basis. They are a result of genuine differences of opinions and perceptions. If all these are not respectfully heard and dealt with, there is antagonism and alienation. Where people feel that they have been heard non-judgmentally and with adequate respect, they are far more likely to participate in the TCI processes, even if it does not fully meet their expectations, than if they were not heard at all. It is not only their absolute (veto) power that empowers them, the opportunity to persuade other stakeholders to accept their point of view also empowers them. Though consensus cannot be built and conflicts cannot be resolved unless there is a spirit of compromise and the acceptance of the principle of “give and take”, the fact that the most disempowered segments of the society have an opportunity, through this process, to ensure that they don’t just “give” but also “take” a little, is itself an empowering experience.

There are many stages in the design of a TCI when conflicts can occur. Some of these are discussed below and tabulated in annex 3.

a) While Setting Broad Goals and Objectives

Usually this is the least controversial stage as the basic explicit goal of all TCIs can be seen to be the promotion of human welfare¹⁰ or poverty alleviation. The broad objectives are also, usually, non-controversial. They could be the protection of the environment, the empowerment of women, improvements in health and sanitation, raising of incomes, increasing agricultural or industrial productivity, eradicating illiteracy, etc.

¹⁰ Some stakeholders might be concerned about ensuring that human welfare does not ignore animal welfare.

b) While Prioritizing Among Objectives

Given the desirability of these various broad objectives, different stakeholders often have differing priorities. Donors usually have priority focus areas partly determined by their own perceptions and partly by the perceptions of their constituents. However, these perceptions tend to change over time, as do the related priorities.

In some cases, donor priorities are explicitly imposed on recipients and TCI grants are offered as inducements. For example, much greater support is currently available for AIDs prevention programs rather than for the prevention of dysentery and diarrhea, even though many governments might consider the latter two to be higher priorities. However, on other occasions governments might seek support for areas that they consider important but competing demands and political realities inhibit their own ability to support it adequately. This is often the case with biodiversity conservation. National governments also have their own priorities and these do not always match those of the donor. Sometimes governments seek additional support for their priority areas, which might or might not match the priorities of the donors.

In the World Development report, 1992, the World Bank stated that "if the poor are to meet the environmental concerns of rich countries, they may reasonably expect to be paid for doing so."

There can be similar differences of perceptions and priorities between and among all the other categories of stakeholders. Most notably, different sections of the civil society (both within the donor and the recipient countries) might have serious misgivings about the priorities implicit or explicit in a TCI or

in a portfolio of TCIs.

c) While Deciding on the Scope

Once the objective has been decided, the scope (coverage/location) needs to be determined. The coverage can be geographical or it could include one or more categories of

potential beneficiaries and exclude others. Here, again, there can be differences between the donor and the recipient government, and within and between other stakeholders, including the sub-national governments, the civil society in general, the people directly affected by the program or project, and by those who are excluded and therefore pay an opportunity cost.

Location is relevant to site specific projects and programs and can again be much debated, especially by those who suffer adverse impacts or those who lose out on potential benefits, because of the proposed location.

d) While Selecting Strategies

Even sharper differences of opinion can arise in determining the strategies to be adopted for achieving the chosen objective. Take, for example, the goal or objective of poverty alleviation. The first level of debate can be on whether poverty should be alleviated by creating more wealth or by redistributing the wealth that already exists, or by doing both.

At the second level, if the decision is to create more wealth, then the debate can be on whether this should be done through the enhancement of agricultural productivity, industrial productivity, etc.

If the focus becomes agricultural productivity, then the debate shifts to whether this should be through dry land farming or irrigated agriculture. And if it is to be irrigated agriculture, then should enhancement be achieved through conserving and better using the water already available or should water supplies be enhanced. If enhancement is thought necessary, then should this be through small irrigation structures or large dams. A similar debate can occur for any other sector or issue.

Of course, most often things are not discussed in such detail and the process of designing a TCI skips most of these steps, coming straight to the operational step of building a dam. Though it might not be possible, each time, to debate fully all the preceding issues, however the lack of a debate and

consensus building on these issues is often a basis of criticism and alienation.

Major differences of opinions can occur between the various stakeholders, including the donor, national and sub-national governments, sections of the civil society, and the consultants.

Opposition could also come from those who are adversely affected by the program or project. This could include those who are physically, economically or socially displaced, or those whose access to economic or natural resources is curtailed. However, this kind of opposition is more common in certain types of approaches, for example where the proposed TCI supports the construction of a dam or the conservation of biodiversity, thereby dislocating people or restricting their access to resources. It can also occur where a TCI intends to help in the growth of the organized and large industry sector at the cost of the artisan, or of village industry. It is less common in efforts where there are no direct losers.

2.4 For Ensuring Stakeholder Responsibility

Though all the steps outlined above might succeed in ensuring that stakeholders take responsibility for the process of TCI design, something more needs to be done if they are to accept responsibility for the TCI itself, especially through its implementation phase. Some of the important and relevant considerations are discussed below.

a) Fighting Donor Dependence

One tragic outcome of donor support has been the development of a dependence syndrome, where nations and communities begin to expect others, especially donors, to come in and solve their problems. Such a mindset is a critical barrier to the owning of responsibility for TCIs.¹¹ The adage of resisting doing the thing right but, instead, trying to do the right thing is particularly relevant here. Barring emergencies, short term, “efficient”, donor driven interventions must be resisted for long term, perhaps less dramatic, local initiatives. The quantum of

¹¹ For an excellent discussion on aid dependence, see Braughtigam 2000.

aid and the size of TCIs, as discussed later, are also of particular relevance here.

A Revealing Incident

Recently, in a high powered international workshop on capacity development, in a part of the world that has significant donor presence, a speaker who was required to make a presentation before a large and distinguished audience discovered that the power-point projector was not functioning. She appealed to the chairperson and to every one in general, to help her. However, there was no perceptible response from any one, including those sitting on the dais. After a few minutes of paralytic inaction, she again appealed for help, and again there was no response. Finally, a donor representative sitting in the audience jumped up and ran to the podium to see if matters could be sorted out. The interesting thing was the inherent mind-block, among the host country members sitting there, to see the problem as their own, requiring some initiative on their part. They waited passively, as they had learned to do, for an obliging donor to step in!

b) Addressing Felt Needs and Priorities

The TCI must address the felt priorities of the stakeholders or reflect a consensus to which they were a party.

ENTRY LEVEL ACTIVITIES

Often rural initiatives are prefaced by what are known as “entry level” activities. These are described as activities designed to give “an entry” into the rural community. In actual fact they reflect a compromise and consensus that has been reached with the local communities. For example, if a TCI is seeking to raise adult literacy levels in a village or a region, that is plagued with acute water shortage, a compromise that is often reached with the villagers is that the TCI would help them dig wells if, in return, they helped in promoting adult literacy. However, for such a compromise to be affected, local level decision making powers and flexibility are required.

c) Ensuring Real Benefits

The TCI must be seen as likely to result in actual benefits and not just notional or elusive ones. TCIs are often focused on outputs rather than on outcomes and impacts¹². People are trained, institutions are strengthened, expertise is transferred or developed, but little effort is made to determine whether the training, the institutions or the expertise is actually delivering the goods and services it was intended to do.

Where TCIs do not have real impacts, the intended beneficiaries lose interest and stop considering it to be their responsibility. Once they have seen many TCIs go this way, then a general skepticism about TCIs develops and it becomes progressively difficult to involve potential beneficiaries and generate any great enthusiasm in them about the next one.

d) Ensuring Cultural, Social and Economic Viability and Optimality

The benefits of each initiative have to be balanced against its financial, economic, social and environmental costs. The initiative also has to be assessed in terms of whether it involves non-negotiable costs, for in different cultures and at different times, some things are held as sacred and not subject to being priced or “traded off”.

Apart from a cost benefit analysis, there is also a need to do a “class benefit” analysis that would determine what classes of people benefit from the initiative and what class have to pay for it. Often, TCIs might contribute positively to economic growth but could adversely affect equity. They could benefit the

¹² There is an admitted problem with the measurement of outcomes or impacts. However, this is partly because TCIs are originally designed to deliver outputs and their milestones and timeframes are accordingly oriented. It, therefore, becomes difficult to retro-fit an outcome or impact based evaluation system. Also, adequate outcome or impact indicators have not yet been developed and tested and, therefore, it seems too soon to abandon the approach. After all, TCIs seek to develop capacity towards some end, and where a holistic view to capacity development is taken, including systems, institutions and individuals, the proof of the pudding must be in the eating.

rich at the cost of the poor, the strong at the cost of the weak or the influential at the cost of the marginalized.

Similarly, the optimality of the initiative has to be determined. Is it the best possible way to achieve the desired results? This cannot be determined in a vacuum and, therefore, options have to be considered. Past experiences and lessons learnt with regard to specific proposed strategies have also to be considered and assessed appropriately in the context of the field reality.

DISTRESSED STATES

Perhaps an exception must be made for distressed states. The allocations for TCIs in countries with wars, failed states or other major natural disasters must not be linked only with performance, for this could result in much needed resources moving away from where they were most direly needed (Gomes et al nd).

e) Locating in Appropriate Time Frames

The time frames within which TCIs are planned and implemented, especially the time available to consult and involve various stakeholders, is also critical in terms of determining the 'ownership friendliness' of TCIs. Rigid timeframes, coupled with large amounts of funding, often lead to a waste of funds, as there is a panic to spend all the money before the TCI closes.

One of the most significant problems in managing change is the difference in the way that cultures look at time. In the western cultures, which most of the donors represent, time is seen as an adversary and the effort is to do things as quickly as possible. In other cultures, especially in Africa and Asia, time is often seen as an ally. Whereas In the west, the less time you take to do a thing the better, in other parts of the world there is a belief that the longer you can afford to take to do something the better it would be assimilated. The rushing into and through things is considered to be uncultured, and even conversations and discussions take, and are designed to take, not hours or even days but weeks and months. Therefore, it is important for donors to appreciate these different cultural

notions of time and to ask themselves not how quickly they can complete a TCI but, rather, how slowly can they afford to do it.

This should, however, not be taken as an alibi for unnecessary delays in TCI planning and implementation. The thrust here is on sensitivity to time-cultures, on assimilation and on making haste slowly - not on inefficiency or bureaucratic delays.

f) Designing for Sustainability

Sustainability is both a benefit of stakeholder ownership and a precondition for it. Unless TCIs are so designed that they have a good chance of sustaining over time, there is a hesitation on the part of the stakeholders to accept responsibility for it. Some of the factors and modalities that impact on TCI sustainability are discussed below.

i. Appropriate Institutional Structures and Staffing

The manner in which TCIs are structured and staffed has a bearing on its long-term viability and sustainability. In general, the greater the integration of these structures into the existing social and governance systems, the greater their chances of persisting over time¹³. Admittedly, in many cases the existing systems and institutions might be inadequate or inappropriate for the proposed TCI. In such cases, there has been a tendency to set up an exclusive system, removed from existing structures, to implement the TCI. However, if considerations of sustainability were to prevail, then the correct approach might be to first, through the TCI, develop and expand the existing systems and institutions (or the

¹³ “Low levels of ownership are only partly related to the rise of adjustment lending in the 1980s, which legitimized an unprecedented degree of external ownership of policy decision normally made by the political leadership of a country (Brautigam and Botchwey, 1998). The widespread use over the past three decades of enclave project implementation or management units, and offshore, off-budget “Special Accounts” for projects, also exacerbated this problem. Although these practices have been condemned by many studies conducted by researchers and donor organizations, they persist. For example, a recent OECD and UNDP study of the aid system in Mali showed that between 1985 and 1995, the majority of donors used project implementation units rather than working through the regular bureaucracy; some donors, including USAID, the World Bank, and Germany (GTZ) used them for *all* of their projects in Mali (1998: 37-50)”(Brautigam 2000).

systemic and institutional capacities) so that they could adequately handle the TCI. Even though this might delay the specific objectives of a TCI, in most cases this would be a wait well worth its while. Of course, such an option might not be available for TCIs designed for emergency relief or where systems and structures have collapsed, as in the case of failed states, but even then an explicit and measurable objective of all TCIs should be to develop indigenous capacities, even while they perform their primary tasks.

Similar problems exist with the staffing of TCIs. Again, as a general principle, TCIs are far more sustainable when staffed by nationals and locals. However, here also there might be a problem of finding enough national and local capacity. Again, where adequate local capacity is not available, the thrust needs to be on developing local capacity prior or concurrent to TCI implementation.

Of course, apart from availability of suitable persons, there are often other less legitimate factors responsible for hiring expatriate consultants and advisors, as discussed later. The domination of TCIs by expatriates can significantly compromise the sustainability of TCIs and also bring in other problems. There are problems of donor credibility when donors prescribe, or often insist upon, cuts in government expenditure and more equitable distribution of resources, but send in consultants who are paid twenty to thirty times what nationals are paid. Elliot Berg (1993) quotes an unnamed "high-ranking" official of the UNICEF :

"I believe that the vast bulk of technical experts and expertise at present provided by the UN and donor system has outlived their usefulness ... judged by the criteria for which they have been provided: the provision of specific technical expertise or experience which is not available among nationals of the country ... for a limited period until national personnel have acquired the training and expertise to take over the job... (Far) from diminishing, the numbers of technical experts provided has grown decade-by-decade since the 1950s...

[Costs have] reached extraordinary disproportions. In Tanzania, for example, the total cost of technical assistance in 1988 was some \$300 million, of which at least \$200 million represented the salaries, per diems, housing allowances, air travel and other direct costs of the 1,000 or so international experts provided as the core of technical assistance. In contrast, the total salary cost of the whole civil service in Tanzania in the same year, including administration, clerical staff, teachers and health workers, was \$100 million. The situation in Tanzania is not untypical... The time has come to rethink the purpose of aid and technical assistance within the UN system."

The excessively high remunerations paid to expatriate consultants causes resentment among national staff. It also helps develop a mindset where levels of remuneration get identified with the quality and quantum of output. Expatriate consultants are also seen as taking away jobs from nationals¹⁴ (Berg 1993).

Also, expatriate experts often have their own ideas of how things should be done and are not always willing to do things the way their hosts would like them to be done. This creates friction, compromises the initiative and often raises the question: whose country and TCI is it anyway?

¹⁴ See also 'Principles for New Orientations in Technical Co-operation'. *The International Journal of Technical Cooperation*, Vol.1, No.1, Summer 1995, pp 1-17.

Though expatriate experts are expected to not only help manage the TCI but also transfer their expertise to local people,

TWO VIEWS ON EXPATRIATES

Flexible and, perhaps, creative arrangements of delivery modes for TC are very important. The modes should vary, depending on the local needs. What I am trying to do in our programmes is to decrease the number of expatriate advisors in cases where local resources are already available.

Like in the case of primary health care, family planning and DOTS for TB patients, high tech. is not necessary. Development of IEC materials acceptable to local people, taking into account of their customs and culture, and community mobilization would be, in many cases, better handled by locally available resources.

Some aid practitioners criticize that the use of expatriate advisors would inflict a negative impact on the ownership and the capacity of recipients. I do not agree. I have observed many cases where the interaction between expatriates and recipient people positively worked, enhancing the technical level and moral of recipient people. In such cases, expatriate advisors worked closely with recipient people, respecting the recipients' ownership and commitment.

Naoyuki Kobayashi, Deputy Director, First Medical Cooperation Division, Japan International Cooperation Agency. Submission to the email discussion, 7 November, 2001

Naoyuki Kobayashi disagrees with the view that expatriate advisors inflict a negative impact on the ownership and capacity of recipients. While there are many cases where the interaction between expatriates and recipients have been productive as he alluded to, much of the criticisms leveled at expatriates relates to the fact that they have tended to take-up an all embracing operational lead role, including the control over the financial resources of the project to the detriment of qualified nationals. Extreme remuneration gaps between expatriates and nationals - sometimes 20-30 times as much, provoke frustrations and anguish among nationals. This has sometimes been compounded by problem of quality and expertise of foreign personnel, partly attributable to inappropriate and dubious selection and recruitment procedures in which the recipient countries have little or no say.

Afeikhena Jerome, Department of Economics, University of Ibadan, Ibadan, Nigeria
Submission to the email discussion, 8 November, 2001

this rarely happens. Partly this is because the "counterpart" system does not seem to work well. Local counterparts are either not properly selected or not adequately motivated to be recipients of transferred expertise. Also, expatriate consultants don't always have the motivation or the ability to perform this part of their function. Besides, not only is capacity development one of the hardest things to measure, mostly the expatriate

consultant is selected for his or her expertise in the area rather than the ability to develop counterpart capacity.

The potential of South-South technical cooperation has not been adequately explored or supported by donors. There is a large amount of expertise available in countries of the south and this expertise is generally more appropriate for countries of the south, than that of the north. Besides, if consultant

GIVING WITH ONE HAND AND TAKING AWAY WITH ANOTHER

In the 1980s various bilateral and multilateral donors initiated major community or social forestry programs. In order to take up TCI activities, a large number of new staff was recruited. When the TCI ended, this staff could not be thrown out and, therefore, continued to be a burden on the state exchequer without having any productive function.

In the later phases, partly as a result of these experiences, a ban was imposed on the recruitment of new staff from TCI funds. Consequently, staff from areas and activities not covered under the TCI were shifted to meet the TCI requirements and conditionalities, resulting in serious neglect of other areas and activities.

remunerations are to be rationalized, consultants from countries of the south would become far more competitive, especially if free market conditions are allowed to operate! The world of consultants needs regular fresh blood of a local and earthy type. Perhaps what is needed is a precondition that expatriate northern consultants will only be hired if, first, it can be shown that there are no suitable national or southern consultants available.

Often, levels of staffing during TCI implementation are much higher than what the system can ordinarily afford. The system gets used to this high levels of staffing and there is a problem of sustainability once the TCI is over, In some cases, where donors insist that TCI funds would not be used for staff salaries, especially for national staff, other equally important sectors are starved and their staff shifted to manage the TCI, because that is a donor conditionality.

ü Appropriate levels of Funding

The levels of funding, the source of funds and the modality of fund transfer are all critical to the sustainability of the TCI

and impinge upon its ownership friendly profile (see annex 4 on funding levels).

Credibility of the donor and of the process of TCIs is critical to the winning of public support. Where the motives, sensitivity or competence of a donor are in question, or where inherent contradictions are seen in the stated objectives of the TCI and

THE PERILS OF TCIS

In a forest fire prevention project, in Indonesia, post project assessments revealed that forest officers had stopped inspecting the field stations. When asked why, they responded that after the completion of the project they did not have money to maintain or run the vehicles that had been bought under the project. Further investigations revealed that, before the project, they all went on inspection trips using public transport. However, as the project had got them used to traveling in their own vehicles, they were no longer willing to travel by public transport. A good example of teaching locals a bad habit at the donors cost!

its modalities, very little acceptability is possible. Such contradictions are obvious when the donor claims to work towards sustainability, but sets up TCIs that use levels of resources impossible to

maintain through national budgets.

The modalities in terms of funding patterns are important considerations for sustainability and ownership. A large proportion of TCIs pump a level of money into the system that is totally disharmonious with local realities. Local implementers and even beneficiaries get used to that amount of funding and are not inclined to work for the significantly reduced patterns of funding that become available after the donor withdraws.

THE SIZE OF TCIs

A factor in this ... is the size and scale of most multi-lateral donor projects. Large corporations are the beneficiaries of large, expensive engineering projects. Since it costs as much in staff-support services to administer a \$500,000 project as a \$50 million effort, an MDB will usually choose the larger scale (Pearl 1989).

In some cases they convince themselves that even the pre-TCI level of activities can no longer be carried out with the reduced amount of money now available, even though these activities were being carried out with less or equal amount of resources before the donor appeared on the scene.

In some cases, a TCI results in

national governments withdrawing their own resources and replacing them by donor resources, thereby not allowing any additionalities to be created. In a sense, this is an abdication by national governments of their own responsibilities. Though this might sometimes be seen to result in a desirable flexibility, often it defeats the whole purpose of the TCI for it fails in strengthening the sector that was considered a priority. Where the TCI is not seen as addressing a felt national priority, such a tendency is common. Most governments, when faced with the opportunity of getting financial support through a TCI in a non-priority sector, shift their own resources out of that sector to higher priority areas and maintain almost the same level of funding as before the TCI, though now with donor funding. It is a hard practice to break. Perhaps the only answer is to set up a system by which the TCI is restricted to match the resources put in through the national budget. This might prevent the total withdrawal of funds.

FUND ADDITIONALITY

In the 1980s various bilateral and multilateral donors initiated major community or social forestry programs. Financial and technical support was given to national and sub-national governments to raise plantations that could meet the basic needs of rural communities. However, subsequent assessments showed that, apart from other technical and social problems, most of the TCIs resulted in national governments withdrawing their own funds from the forestry sector and replacing these by the TCI support. The fact that the TCIs were focused only on social or community forestry meant that all other aspects of forestry got seriously neglected, and the forests ended up worse than before.

Large budget TCIs that are far beyond the standards prevalent or possible in the host countries are essentially unsustainable and potentially counter-productive. Similarly, levels of operational expenses that are far beyond the existing, and also perhaps the desirable, levels of spending in the recipient countries, also lead to undesirable distortions. The adoption of frugal norms of funding and expenditure would not only

make TCIs more acceptable to national stakeholders, but would also promote sustainability and allow the same amount of money to go much further and do much more good. Added to that, the practice of building into TCI design the gradual replacement of donor funds by national funds, while maintaining the same level of activities and during the life of the TCI, would not only ensure that TCIs are funded at a level that is replicable by national governments and communities, but also that the completion of donor support for the TCI does not result in any dislocation.

iii. Addressing Root Causes

Another contentious issue has been whether TCIs should address only the symptoms of a problem or attempt to tackle the root cause. This has been an issue particularly with the project approach, but also continues with the programmatic approach, even where the programs are sector wide. In fact, looking at problems through the project or even the sector perspective never brings out the true inter-linkages between problems and sectors. Though, admittedly, as a first response, even local communities want the symptoms tackled (stomachs filled, shelter provided, etc.), in the medium to long term the exclusive focus on symptoms inhibits sustainability. Most affected populations do not think in sectors, but would like problems to be solved in a permanent and fundamental way.

Chapter 3 -FACTORS INHIBITING STAKEHOLDER OWNERSHIP

The various constraints to a wider stakeholder involvement and ownership are discussed below, separately for different categories of stakeholders.

3.1 Factors Inhibiting the Involvement of National Governments

Of all the stakeholders, national governments are the ones that donors involve the most with the design and implementation of TCIs. However, even at this level, there are often major differences between the perceptions of national governments and donors (see also annex 5 for a similar explanation), National governments would like to do things their own way, and do it themselves, as long as the donor is willing to pay for it. In some cases, national governments do welcome expatriate consultants, either because they feel that the expertise these consultants bring is critical and not available internally, or they see them as extra budgetary staff that can assist in their work without being a burden on their budget (Berg 1993).

There is donor resistance to allowing national governments to design and handle TCIs on their own for one or more of many reasons:

- Most commonly, donors feel that there is not adequate institutional and individual capacity within the country.*
- The donors also have reservations about the sincerity and/or objectivity of national implementers.*
- Very often, the bureaucratic procedures of a donor are so complex and onerous that only those who have earlier experience with the donor can operate them.*
- In other cases, bilateral donors themselves are under pressure to provide employment for their own country nationals. Consultants, many with associations and linkages within the agency, often pressurize donors to find jobs for them. There is also a powerful system of patronage determining the hiring of consultants.*

- *There are cultural considerations and many donor personnel feel more comfortable working with their own than with people from different cultures and backgrounds.*

So much for cultural diversity

At a meeting organized in Geneva to discuss issues relating to reforming technical cooperation, a donor representative heartily endorsed the view that there must be a move towards employing a larger proportion of national consultants to design and implement TCIs. However, he quickly added that this was because most of them had, in any case, studied in American Universities!!

Some of the other factors that play a role in donor decisions regarding the appropriate levels of involvement of national governments are:

- *Whether national governments are seen to represent a minority viewpoint, which is at variance with the majority or other viewpoints, as is sometimes the case with military dictatorships, with non-popular governments, or with governments that have an elitist class character.*

CHANGING FASHIONS

Some years ago, when television was just gaining the sort of influence it has today, there were demands from the public of many northern countries to keep “starving babies off their TV screens”. The demand, interestingly, was not for the media to stop filming starving babies but for their governments to do more to stop babies from starving. This had a profound impact on donor priorities, especially towards Africa and Asia, where the phenomenon was most prevalent.

Later, when environmental consciousness grew across the world, there was a public hue and cry to conserve species, especially “sexy” species like the tiger, and ecosystems, especially the rain forests. Consequently, many donor agencies started “greening” their projects and programs. Meetings were held to determine how an environmental aspect could be introduced, or even retro fitted, into their activities.

Recently, poverty alleviation has become the new public slogan. Therefore many donor agencies have decided to focus on poverty alleviation and some insist that even their forestry programs must have poverty alleviation as the primary objective!

At a conference on capacity development, organized recently in West Africa, a persistent complaint was ‘how can capacities of countries develop when, just as we are learning to do one thing in one way, the donors change their priorities and ask us to start doing another thing in another way?’

- Whether national governments have majority support (through elections or otherwise), but are seen to be insensitive to minority viewpoints, as is sometimes the case with governments representing dominant, yet not universal, religious or sectarian viewpoints
- Whether there are effective national governments capable of making decisions and implementing TCIs.
- Whether national governments are considered regressive, for example the non-democratic ones, or those insensitive to equity or gender issues, to human rights or to environmental concerns.
- Whether national governments profess political or economic ideologies that are at variance with those of the donor countries, typically free market economies versus planned economies, regulated societies versus “open” societies, or where their stated priorities are considered inappropriate by the donors.
- Whether national governments are perceived to be dominated by a few self-serving individuals.
- Whether national governments subscribe to the broad, hidden or explicit, agendas of donor countries, for example in relation to nuclear proliferation, patent or copyright requirements or international trade regimes.

Underlying some of these, there are cultural differences between donors and recipients. The two often differ on what is meant by justice, by democracy, by participation and even by efficiency. Though most often these might be genuine elements of cultural diversity, they are often understood by donors to be elements of what is wrong rather than what is different.

Where, for any of these or other reasons, donors decide that national governments are not worthy of shared ownership, they often take it upon themselves to “persuade” these governments to do what they consider to be in their best interests. This all too common phenomenon was described very aptly, by a participant in the Geneva meeting, as being akin to

“the monkey persuading the cat to eat a banana, because it is thought to be good for the cat!”.

However, it is not only pure persuasion that takes place. The temptation of additional finances or the threat of stopping existing resource flows usually helps in persuading national governments to accept donor prescriptions. This approach

CONDITIONALITIES

Stung by widespread and vehement criticism on the adverse impacts of their assistance on some of the poorest people of the world, many donors have started prescribing stringent procedures for assessing and mitigating adverse impacts on people, especially indigenous people, affected by TCIs (World Bank Operational Directives 4.20 and 4.30 are examples of this). Though the spirit behind these measures is laudable, the rigidity with which they are applied and the manner in which they are imposed has led to various distortions. Many of the countries where they have been imposed resent them bitterly. But, what is worse, rather than seeing the desirability of adopting measures similar to those prescribed in the ODs, many governments spend most of their time trying to see how they can get around them.

In TCIs where illegal occupants of public land have to be shifted out, the rehabilitation packages prescribed for them are so liberal that, after their ‘displacement’, they become economically far better off than the remaining population in that area who had not initially encroached on public lands. This leads to resentment, on the one hand, among those who chose not to break the law, and encourages others to go and squat on public land in the hopes that some donor would come along pay for their ‘displacement’!

mostly compromises the possibility of national governments having a real sense of ownership towards the TCI.

Conditionalities: One of the major instruments that donors use to ensure that the larger realities within which the TCI operates are as per their liking is the imposition of conditionalities. Conditionalities are sometimes used to force those systemic changes that donors consider desirable, but recipient governments do not. Such conditionalities either reflect the political and ideological interests of donor countries, or donor prescriptions on what is right for recipient countries. Some conditionalities do not address systems but prescribe how a particular TCI should operate, independent of the larger system.

On the face of it, some conditionalities might look benign. For example, donors while supporting structural adjustments invariably insist on the cutting down of bureaucracies. In other cases, there is a demand to ensure environmental protection and adequate compensation packages for those displaced by TCI projects and programs. However, there are other more controversial conditionalities, including those that insist on the abolition of economic and financial subsidies, on the privatization of social services, on free access to multinational corporations or even on a shift to cash crops.

The real problem, in terms of ownership, is that these conditions are forced on host governments who, consequently, do not have any sense of ownership towards them or towards

THE MULTILATERAL DEVELOPMENT BANK (MDB)

The MDB has another kind of power over borrowers: The good credit imprimatur it can bestow is a necessary prelude to access to private capital. This means that borrowers must comply with MDB loan conditions even if the loan is a minimal part of a much larger project, simply to be able to borrow from other creditors. Whether this power is used for the “good” (e.g., a requirement to replace an environmentally harmful pesticide with a relatively safe alternative) or the “bad” (e.g., a requirement to cancel a law requiring a multinational corporation of locate manufacturing as well as extractive facilities within the host country’s borders) depends on the policies established by the bank, which in turn can be influenced by the taxpayers of donor countries pressing their representatives on the board of governors to monitor project approvals for compliance with principles the donor nations wish to promote..... The other development banks also reflect the priorities of their leading donors.

the TCI they accompany. Also, especially when they are not addressing systemic changes, they sometimes create serious distortions in the larger system.

3.2 Factors Inhibiting the Involvement of Sub-National Governments

Sub-national governments include provincial or state governments, municipal authorities and local governments, many of whom have varying degrees of political independence and have the direct responsibility of administering national, sub-national and local projects, programs and policies. Most of the factors that inhibit the involvement of national governments are also applicable to sub-national governments.

In addition, the involvement of sub-national governments is inhibited by some other factors:

- A hesitation, sometimes even an antipathy, among national governments to allow the direct participation of “lower” levels of government.*
- A hesitation among even sub-national governments to allow the participation of more local or decentralized levels of government “below” them. The irony here is that often those who want decision making power to be decentralized to them, from above, are themselves unwilling to further decentralize such power and control to those below them.*
- A danger of creating or aggravating tensions between national and sub-national governments and between various sub-national governments, and thereby destabilizing the political situation.*
- The difficulties in coordinating activities being run directly by sub-national governments.*
- The inability to persuade national governments to shed their bureaucratic structures designed for supervising and coordinating activities that are now being coordinated by lower levels. This often results in an increasing proportion of the TCIs’ resources being diverted to non-productive and unnecessary “management” costs.*

3.3 Factors Inhibiting the Involvement of Beneficiary Communities

In recent years, the value of consulting beneficiary

ACCESSING THE COMMUNITY

Many national governments take extraordinary measures to ensure that donors do not directly access the community and NGOs, especially as agents for implementation. In India, there is a Foreign Contribution Regulation Act that prohibits any non-government organization from receiving funds from any foreign source without the explicit clearance of the government. This clearance is invariably difficult to get. The Inter-American Foundation found itself expelled from Brazil when it attempted to by-pass the government and reach out directly to NGOs and community organizations (Ayers 1983).

communities, either directly or through community institutions and NGOs, and determining their felt needs and priorities, has been increasingly

recognized. However, even at this level many of the factors inhibiting the involvement of national and sub-national governments persist. There are perceptions relating to “false consciousness”, to ignorance and to unacceptable political and cultural values. There is also the hesitation to create creating political ripples between various levels of the government and between various community groups, or between and within different community groups. Besides, national governments are even more apprehensive about letting donors talk directly with communities, community groups and NGOs, than they are about letting them deal with sub-national governments. In almost all the recipient countries a request to deal directly with local communities would either be rejected outright or the dialogue and interaction stage-managed by the government. The apprehensions of national governments are also not without basis or justification. Many political thinkers have expressed reservations about letting donor agencies deal directly with local communities. Rajni Kothari (1986), says that there are “pervasive and powerful forces that are at work to which perhaps a large part of the present genre of NGOs, particularly those involved in “delivering development”, have themselves unwittingly contributed.....both world capitalism and

LISTENING TO UNHEARD VOICES

Action Aid, an international NGO, has initiated an interesting exercise in many countries of the South. Titled “Listening to People in Poverty”, it involves teams of experts, volunteers and Action Aid’s own national staff moving around and talking to the most marginalized and oppressed groups in society. The objective is to create an understanding of poverty, marginalization, exclusion, deprivation and injustice, from the experiences and perceptions of people living in condition of poverty. The current exercise focuses on four themes: conditions of chronic hunger; children who are ‘left-out’ of education; women and children in institutions such as jails, juvenile justice and women’s rescue homes, and mental hospitals; and poor or corrupt and arbitrary governance.

important institutions involved in “development” - the World Bank, IMF, UNDP, various donor agencies and consortia - are discovering in the NGO model a most effective instrument of promoting their interest in penetrating Third World economies and particularly their rural interiors which neither private industries nor government bureaucracies

were capable of doing. Besides, they present an image that is far less threatening than the other two.” In addition, there are some further constraints:

- Very often appropriate community institutions are not available through which donors could work with the community.*
- Communities are not homogeneous and it is difficult to ensure that the voices of all segments, especially the least empowered, are heard clearly.*
- Sometimes, community priorities reflect values that are incomprehensible to outsiders and donor representatives.*
- If one starts a dialogue with the community and is then not able to meet with their aspirations, then the resentment and rejection could even be greater than if they were not consulted at all.*
- Communities need a long timeframe within which to meaningfully respond to proposals or questions. Usually the preparation phase of TCIs do not allow for such time frame. (Perhaps the tendency of paid consultants to drag projects on can be converted to an advantage here).*
- Communities also need to be, in advance, given the information, especially about options to, and results and impacts of, TCIs. This is a precondition if they are to make informed choices. However, the capacity to convey this information in an understandable format is rarely available with donors.*

3.4 Factors Inhibiting the Involvement of Intended Direct Losers

These typically include individuals and organizations/agencies whose activities or influence the TCI is aiming to curb because they are seen as a part of the problem. These could include corrupt or non-performing functionaries targeted as a part of good governance TCIs or of TCIs designed to improve the delivery of goods and services to the people.

Whereas, on the face of it, there appears to be little justification for giving such people a voice, in actual fact there are many reasons to include them as legitimate stakeholders. For one, unless some effort is made to get them on board, they could be the most powerful and persistent opponents to the TCI that seeks to marginalize them. Secondly, in some cases, they might themselves be victims of circumstances, being corrupt because they do not get adequate wages, being non-performers because there are inadequate incentives to perform, inappropriate working conditions or simply poor preparation and training. In fact, an involvement of such people could go a long way in discovering what really ails the system.

There might be others who do what they do because they have no real options. The development of legitimate options might be the best way of neutralizing these individuals.

That is not to say that each one of them must be rehabilitated and their ill deeds condoned, but an effort to rehabilitate them would not only more easily diminish their opposition but also help prevent the mischief that these marginalized, yet active, agents might be up to in the system. Therefore, a part of the TCIs activities should try and develop, in partnership with these people, not only a better diagnosis of the problem but also an effective rehabilitation system, which seeks to divert their attention from undesirable pursuits and helps them to use their energy and talents constructively. Unless they are helped on to a path of legitimate and constructive activities, they would themselves become destitute and subsequently qualify for

external support or, what is worse, oppose the reforms or find new illegitimate avenues to satisfy their inclinations.

The constraints in involving them in the planning stage are many.

- For one, there is a fear that if they get advance notice of what is being planned, they might either scuttle the proposal at its infancy or at least get the time to build up an effective opposition
- Also, as they are seen as the “bad people or agencies”, there is little sympathy and much antagonism among them.
- Sometimes, it is difficult or imprudent to identify the specific negative individuals or agencies, as this might politicize the TCI and bring in extraneous considerations.
- The legitimacy and moral right of external agencies to sit in judgment of national functionaries and agencies is also sometimes questionable.
- Finally, many of these intended losers might enjoy enormous political support and any effort to focus on them might be counter productive.

3.5 Factors Inhibiting the Involvement of Unintended Direct Losers

Those physically, economically and socially displaced by a TCI are, in many ways, the most critical stakeholders, both from the perspective of social justice and in order to ensure that TCIs actually do more good than harm. If the losses of these stakeholders cannot be minimized then, sometimes, the overall gains of a TCI become questionable. Poverty is a dynamic and

THE COSTS OF CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT

An assessment of a TCI designed to build the capacity of a rural artisan group producing leather goods revealed that though the intended beneficiaries had significantly improved their income levels, by producing better goods more efficiently, and by marketing them more effectively, other groups of leather workers in the area who had not been covered by the TCI, lost out their markets to the beneficiary group and were, therefore, on the verge of starvation.

not a static phenomenon. In the process of helping some people to move out of poverty, others can be pushed into poverty.

They are, however, another category of stakeholders who are almost never involved in the implementation of a TCI. Most often, they do not even know about its existence or details till they are confronted with its negative impacts. In some cases they protest, but usually it is too late. In many cases they just disappear and no one really knows what happened to them. Those of them that survive become candidates for the next round of TCIs, for they lose most or all of what they had and also lose much of their cultural and geographical identity.

Whereas, huge investments are made to maximize the benefits of intended beneficiaries, investments on minimizing negative impacts are less liberally supported for they are considered to be unproductive expenditure. Most TCIs are assessed for their achievement of stated objectives, and these are mostly or totally oriented towards the intended beneficiaries. Very few, if any, of the TCIs also assess what incidental (or “collateral”) damage occurs.

The failure to take note of the perceptions and interests of these stakeholders not only results in their being alienated and antagonistic, but also focuses the wrath of many other groups on the TCI. There are, therefore, serious implications on the sense of ownership of the TCI. The number and plight of unintended losers depends to some extent on the nature of TCIs. TCIs in the health sector, in agricultural and rural development, in energy conservation and development, in good governance, etc., especially if they are well designed, would have relatively few unintended losers, especially compared to the number of intended beneficiaries. However, TCIs in sectors like irrigation, especially large dams, biodiversity conservation, industrial and mining development, and urban development, can have a huge number of unintended losers. Much of this is because of displacement, but many are also affected because of their traditional markets being taken over by industrialized goods, or because of pollution, other health hazards, and because of restrictions in the use of natural resources.

Some of the major factors that inhibit the involvement of these people are:

- *The apprehension that any early contact would result in opposition of the TCI at a stage when it is most vulnerable.*
- *The fact that they are, mostly, the least empowered segments*

**NATURE RESERVES MANAGEMENT PROJECT:
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA**

One of the components of the project was aimed at enhancing people's participation in reserve management. It envisaged participatory planning for the use of resources by local people in designated zones of nature reserves. The planning and implementation of participatory plans for resource use included:

1. PRA training for staff of the nature reserves
2. Developing community resource management plans with the involvement of local communities
3. Implementing income generation activities for local communities through community investment grants as a part of the community resource management plans
4. Various education and awareness activities aimed at local communities.

[Project Document]

of the population, with little or no political support.

- *The unwillingness to invest in a way that these potential losers could actually become beneficiaries, at least in the more tangible aspects. Such investments are often seen as uneconomical.*
- *A lack of adequate conflict resolution mechanisms that could get even those*

who stand to lose the most to become partners in the initiative.

- *The fact that they are mostly invisible, at least till their lives begin to be affected by the TCI.*

Chapter - 4 - NEW AND CHANGING MODALITIES

4.1 Assessment of Completed and Ongoing TCIs

A survey of 132 completed and ongoing TCIs in all parts of the world and a review of secondary literature on the issue, suggest that TCIs have tended to be disproportionately owned

WILDLANDS PROTECTION: CONGO

The project developed a co-management board with local communities (COGERON) in the Conkouati Reserve. The NGOs that were involved in the project kept it going despite little or no support from the government [ID Review]. Apparently, innovative partnerships were set up under the project between NGOs and the private sector [ES, OED].

by donors. Involvement of national governments was relatively weaker, but still stronger than the involvement of most

other stakeholders, especially those directly affected by the TCI.

A majority of the TCIs studied (see annex 1 for details and list) related to the management of natural resources. In terms of looking for solutions this could be a very important sample because they are among the most difficult types of TCIs to own. However, in terms of assessing the existing levels of ownership such a sample, for the same reasons, might present a bleaker picture than is actually the case.

These TCIs were ongoing and completed in the 1990s and were mainly UNDP and World Bank funded, covering nearly a hundred countries across the World. The TCIs were assessed on the basis of their project documents and on the basis of mid-term and final evaluation reports, wherever available. Essentially, an effort was made to see the levels and appropriateness of the participation of various stakeholders in their design and implementation. The stakeholders regarding whom information was gathered were national governments, local

beneficiaries, NGOs, national scientific institutions and individuals and the private sector. Very little information was available about the involvement of those adversely affected, sub-national governments and the civil society, in general. Therefore, data about these categories were not analyzed as a part of the over-all analysis. Similarly, though many of the

TCIs had provisions for stakeholder participation, most of them did not appear to explicitly address the issues of empowerment and of consensus building. Consequently, these aspects were also dropped from the general analysis. However, an in-depth assessment of 14 TCIs was done and is presented in annex 2.

**African NGO-Government Partnerships for Sustainable Biodiversity
Action: Africa**

The project was designed to elicit participation and consequent ownership of project outputs and results through establishing a partnership for conservation of Important Bird Areas (IBAs) in 10 African countries among NGOs, Government and local communities. Establishment of institutional structures to facilitate participation of all three groups in the IBA was envisaged. [Project Document]

In all the participating countries, National Liaison Committees composed of both government and non-government institutions had been formed and were reported to be functional. However, the degree of their effectiveness was reportedly varied. Also, relatively few local stakeholders were reportedly made a part of the National Liaison Committees. [Mid Term Review (MTR), pg 11]

All the participating countries had been able to identify IBAs, but the subsequent actions to conserve and/or monitor them had not been taken. Also, the project design had not laid out a common methodology for action or tasks to be taken up after the process of identification of IBAs was complete. There was, therefore, a great deal of variation in planning and implementing actions/tasks subsequent to identification of IBAs. [MTR pg 12]




It was pointed out that the capacity of the lead NGOs in different countries was varied. Therefore, while in some countries the lead NGOs had developed comprehensive conservation programmes that had a good chance of being funded, in some other countries the conservation process initiated through the identification of IBAs was not likely to develop beyond project termination. [MTR pg 13]

PROTECTING BIODIVERSITY AND ESTABLISHING SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN THE SABANA-CAMAGUEY ECOSYSTEM: CUBA

The project proposed to create an integrated strategic plan for the Sabana-Camaguey region taking into account the needs of the private sector involved in tourism [Project Document].


According to the final evaluation of the project, it "...achieved an unusual degree of inter-institutional collaboration and produced the integration and consensus among the scientific community and development interests that were major goals of the project. The goals of the program, and a concerted effort to define practical means to achieve sustainable forms of development and biodiversity conservation, are understood and supported by all major stakeholders."

"One of the strengths of the project is that it is "owned" by Cuban institutions. The project director and senior staff are all Cubans of exceptional capability and dedication...The fact that it [the project] is led by nationals, and reaches deep into national and provincial institutions, has generated a remarkable degree of ownership and pride in this effort."



The assessment findings suggest that the most widely involved stakeholders were the national governments. In over 90% of the TCIs studied there appeared to be

some level of involvement of the national governments in the process of design and implementation. However, only in 13% was this judged to be extensive and in the remaining it was little (24%) or moderate (55%).



61% of the TCIs reported some level of involvement of the local beneficiaries, however, only 6% reported extensive involvement. Another 33% reported moderate involvement and 22% a little

involvement. 59% of the TCIs reported involving NGOs, with 8% reporting extensive involvement, 30% moderate and 20% little.

Private sector involvement was very poor at 16% of the TCIs, with only one (0.8%) reporting extensive involvement. National scientific institutions and individuals fared a little better with 51% of the TCIs reporting some involvement, though only 5% reported extensive and 30% moderate involvement.

It must, however, be kept in mind that a large proportion of the TCIs assessed were ongoing and no evaluation study was available. Therefore, some of the data presented here represent the intention rather than the fact of participation.

Based on this assessment and on other secondary sources relating to recent TCIs, it seems obvious that there has been a move towards greater stakeholder involvement, especially of national governments and beneficiary communities. Some of the new modalities adopted for facilitating stakeholder participation are listed below¹⁵.

4.2 Some New Modalities

In recent years, various new modalities have been introduced by donors and national governments to facilitate participation and ownership. Some of the important ones are listed below. As most of them are well known, they are not being described but only listed. However, sources of additional information are provided.

¹⁵ I am particularly grateful to Peter Morgan and Leonard Joy for information on these.

a) Facilitation and/or Process Consultation

There are now many techniques in this category that try to induce the participation of those whose commitment and resources will be crucial for effective implementation.

Process consultation is a practice of management consultation in which the consultant assists the client management group to initiate and sustain a process of change and continuous learning for systemic improvement.¹⁶

The various techniques of facilitation/consultation include the following:

- Search conferences*
- Open space technology*
- Appreciative inquiry*
- Conflict resolution mechanisms*
- Various approaches to organizational self-assessment*

b) E-learning and Consultations

The World Bank presentation at the Turin meeting highlighted the growth of e-learning and e-consultations. The UNDP study is also focusing on this aspect of TCIs. These include:

- Studies and surveys*
- Networks and consultations*
- Access to learning and technical advice*
- The Temporal Logic Model¹⁷*

c) Survey Techniques

These include participatory surveys of problems, priorities and perceived solutions, carried out independently of TCIs or any specific TCI. They seek to involve the civil society and its various segments into a process of self analysis, throwing up action

¹⁶ *Process Consultation for Systemic Improvement of Public Sector Management. UNDP. 1994, as quoted in Joy nd.*

¹⁷ *See, for details, Molly den Heyer, 'The Temporal Logic Model™: A Concept Paper'. 2001. Evaluation Unit, IDRC*

plans that can be adopted by donors and national governments alike. The Action Aid efforts at "listening to unheard voices" and the Indian "Biodiversity Conservation Prioritization Project" are two examples of such a method described elsewhere in this paper.

d) New Types of Resource Transfer Mechanisms

There are a number of what might be described as collective, coordinated approaches to development cooperation including TCIs

- SWAPs
- Budget Support¹⁸
- PRSPs¹⁹
- TA pooling²⁰
- National execution
- Cost sharing²¹
- UNDAF models²²

e) Project or Program Management

There are also changes in the ways TCIs are designed and delivered:

- More incremental and process-oriented forms of project and program design
- Participatory monitoring and evaluation
- Contract-based TCIs offered by SIDA²³
- Results-based management-RBM (Lavergne 2002)²⁴

¹⁸ "The integration of external assistance into the budget strengthens local ownership by linking aid more closely to local priorities through agreement with donors, civil society, and the government on the overall strategy for poverty reduction. There is a growing realization that politics matters and that integrating aid into the budget, which is more closely related to local parliamentary processes, strengthens commitment and accountability." (OECD 2001)

¹⁹ For details, see OECD 2001a. Also, see Grindle 2001.

²⁰ As set out in the ECDPM presentation at Turin

²¹ As set out in the Carlos del Castillo paper distributed at the Turin workshop

²² See Richmond 2001 AND Joint Nordic Assessment (Anon 2001c).

²³ As set out in the SIDA presentation at Turin

- *Partnerships*
- *TOKEN - Transfer of Knowledge Through Expatriate Nationals. This UNDP initiated modality aims at mobilizing cost effective technical services of expatriates living abroad to work for short periods in their country of origin to support the country's development process.*²⁵

f) New Clients or Target Groups

Some of the new TCI modalities deal with new actors in the private and public sectors and the partnerships that their involvement can generate.

- *Private sector*
- *Civil society*
- *Those adversely affected*

These modalities can be combined. Facilitation techniques can help to design a SWAP on an incremental basis, which can include e-discussions amongst civil society participants.

²⁴ See also 'RBM and Accountability for Aid Effectiveness: A Statement of Principles for CIDA Staff'. 2002. (Mimeo)

²⁵ Source: Web site www.totken-vn.org/vn/introduction.html

Chapter 5 - CONCLUSIONS

An assessment of past practices and experiences brings out clearly that though there has been significant progress in the last few years towards involving national governments into the design and implementation of TCIs, and to a lesser extent, involving local communities, most other categories of stakeholders are still left out. Even for national governments and local communities, though levels of participation seem to have gone up, there seems to be little progress towards genuine empowerment and consensus building.

There are many factors that appear to still constraint movement towards a more appropriate type and level of ownership by stakeholders. The three most important ones, out of these, which recur in most of the writings and are obvious from a detailed examination of ongoing and completed TCIs, seem to be:

- Political interests*
- Commercial interest*
- Lack of capacity*

These three factors are discussed below.²⁶ However, despite the constraints, there are great opportunities for stakeholders, especially those local communities that are likely to benefit or lose, to make a difference. A demand for participation, answerability and transparency, along with a focus on community needs and local knowledge, can significantly help to make TCIs more responsible. Donors and governments have to be sensitive to these demands or, where they are not, strategic alliances have to be forged between the different stakeholders, between national and international NGOs and the media, to force a change that is already much overdue.

²⁶ Peter Morgan has given an alternate and more detailed set of reasons (Morgan 2001).

a) Political Interests

The fact that, in many ways, the involvement of non-governmental and local stakeholders often compromise many

REAL AGENDA

I am hardly the first to feel that the West aid programmes (1950's-1990) were actually trying to buy international political stability. Development, if it happened, was a byproduct. ODA dropped off substantially with the collapse of the Soviet Union. That, in my opinion, was not a coincidence? I would enjoy having someone show that I am completely wrong.

Patrick Shima, USA, UNDP retired

Submission to the email discussion, 8 November, 2001

of the hidden and stated interests of donors and governments, has perhaps been the most important constraint to expanded ownership. There is an understanding of what needs to be done in order to expand ownership. How to do it is also reasonably clear. But unless donors and governments really want to go down this road, all of this would lead nowhere.

Many people have asked the question: do donors and national governments (or for that matter the development industry) really want to reform? There is evidence to the contrary.²⁷

There are numerous reports and studies that have pointed out many of the ownership related problems that this report records and have given various constructive suggestions on how to overcome them. But why is it that no one seems to take notice?

i. Donor interests

The intended direct beneficiaries, especially beneficiary communities, are universally recognized to be among the most legitimate owners of TCIs. It is recognized that they must determine what needs to be done on the basis of their own felt needs. However, there are many reasons why donors and governments have been reluctant to share ownership with these categories of stakeholders.

²⁷ A point made repeatedly by Peter Burgess in the e-mail discussion.

There has often been a tendency among donors to resist the transfer of power and control that is an inevitable outcome of the transfer of even a part of ownership. Sometimes this is a result of the megalomania of donor agencies, or of individuals within them. However, equally prevalent is a “benign arrogance”, perhaps even more dangerous in its effects, that make donor agencies believe that they alone know what is best for others (also see annex 6 for some other key contradictions).

WHAT ENTITLES YOU TO A TCI?

At a very interesting discussion in the recently organized Pan African Workshop on Capacity Development, In Bamako, representatives of various African nations decried the fact that their countries were not surrounded by powerful communist blocks. Consequently, they felt that, in the “cold war” era, they had lost out in the race for foreign assistance because there were no major political compulsions for countries of the western world to support their development process.

In such cases, the final “balance of power” and ownership is determined by many factors including the political clout of the recipient country, how desperate it is for the TCI and how desperate is the donor to set up the TCI. The position varies from country to country and donor to donor. In reality, different countries (and different TCIs) have different profiles. In some cases the donor (almost) totally decided what the TCI is going to be like, either on the basis of what it considered to be in the best interest of the recipient or on the basis of what it considered to be in its own best interest, or both. In other cases, the TCI is almost totally as designed by the recipient, with a few concessions to the views of the donor. In the latter case, perhaps the interest of the donor is adequately served just by the fact that there is a TCI, irrespective of its nature.

THE THIRD DIMENSION

(There is a "third dimension" of ownership problems, namely when stakeholders on both sides collude to usurp some functions and pre-empt resources. This often happens when sector experts and professionals on both sides find that they have common interests... Such coalitions between donor and recipient stakeholders can for instance usurp the planning, finance and strategy functions from national finance officials

Perhaps, TCIs have always been admirably achieving what they were really intended to achieve. From the point of view of the donor, they provide good jobs to

their staff and to a horde of experts and consultants. They satisfy public demand to get out and do something constructive, and the short interest span of the public ensures that no one waits around to find out what was actually achieved. For donor governments, they provide a powerful tool to pursue their own political and commercial interests. Besides, support to TCIs gives them an aura of respectability in the global community: "look, we are doing our bit for the poor and the downtrodden."

ii. Government Interests

Despite all this, countries seek them out because national leaders get free or cheap money, and lots of hard currency, to pursue their own agendas. They can travel around the world, all in the name of seeking and promoting TCIs. They can use TCIs as a form of political patronage and their ability to secure foreign assistance can help their political prospects. And the development industry grows fat and perpetuates itself. In all this, where are the actual intended beneficiaries?

Is this is too cynical a view of the political reality? Is it an over simplistic one? For, in most countries, donor or recipient, there are individuals in power who are genuinely moved by the suffering and injustice in the world. Yet, how much maneuverability do they have in the real world?

Perhaps a realistic assessment would suggest that both donors and recipient governments have certain hidden agendas that are not going to be easily abandoned, especially in the short term. However, even after these agendas have been fulfilled, there remains some space to make TCIs more meaningful and

a better reflection of the felt needs of legitimate beneficiaries. It is for the good people within the system to make the most of this space, even while they fight the larger battle to widen it.

b) Commercial Interests

Though there is value in using TCIs to introduce the best and latest expertise and technology, so that all countries have at least the opportunity to upgrade their own capacities, high or advanced technological solutions pose special challenges of ownership. Very often, technology that is not the most appropriate for a country or a region is introduced just because that is what the donor wants to procure or the expatriate consultants know best.

Many donors link TCIs with the transfer or sale of their own goods or services (bilaterals) or their preferred ones (multilaterals). This is also a form of conditionality, though specific to the acquisition of goods and services. Apart from the fact that such goods and services are not always appropriate or optimal for the host country, the impetus among donors to find markets for their own goods and services or those of the “developed world”, often

ABSURD “HIGHTECH” SOLUTIONS

A donor supported TCI in Indonesia, aimed at preventing and combating the forest fires that occurred there with disturbing regularity, invested a large proportion of its budget in building a sophisticated satellite and aerial surveillance system, operating out of Singapore. The expectations were that this system would give early warning of fires and allow them to be put out before they spread. However, subsequent field assessments revealed that by the time information about fires was uploaded in Singapore, conveyed to Jakarta, forwarded to the regional headquarters and finally reached the field, many days had passed and the fires were either already out or had already spread. However, in many cases, despite the failure of this system, fires were being detected at an early stage and being put out. Enquiries at the local level suggested that the most effective method of getting information about fires was through a network of ham radio operators who had been unofficially and without any support performing this surveillance function for many years. The TCI could have strengthened this system and got much better results for a fraction of the cost that was incurred on the satellite system.

While loans are made to developing nations, in reality most funds end up outside the third world. Of the World Bank's procurement disbursements (e.g., for machinery, consultants) until 1985, 80.7 percent went to developed countries and members of OPEC (Pearl 1989).

leads to a disregard of indigenous capacity, even if it is more appropriate. It also means that very high costs have to be paid and that a large proportion of the TCI budget goes into these goods and services and, what is worse, goes out of the host country and to countries of the North. It is worthwhile noting that Canada and Netherlands, along with some others, have been notable for avoidance of tying aid to purchase of their own goods and services.

c) Lack of Capacity

Given the right intentions, the most common factor inhibiting a move towards more local ownership is the perceived lack of institutional and individual capacities adequate and appropriate to design, plan for and implement TCIs. This often leads donors to get involved directly, or through their consultants, to take over the roles that should legitimately have been those of national governments and of other national stakeholders. Efforts to retain a sense of local ownership even while managing the TCI non-locally are laudable but usually ineffective. Besides, sustainability is badly compromised.

"It is hard to stop doing things right, instead of doing the right things"

Herfkens 2001

Consequently, it is important that TCIs be seen primarily as capacity development initiatives where the assessment of existing capacities and the development of required additional capacities must be the primary or even the sole function. Once these capacities have been developed, the initiative can move into its next phase of supporting activities designed and implemented nationally and locally. Methods must also be developed to assess effective enhancement in capacities and such an assessment must become an inherent part of TCI assessments.

It is not enough to just develop local planning and implementation capacities. The capacity to develop capacities, and to maintain and upgrade the developed capacities, must also be developed. External interventions must focus on providing the original expertise specifically appropriate to develop the capacity to develop capacity. Towards this end, it is important that the consultants selected for the TCI are chosen as much for their expertise in the area as they are for their ability to develop capacity (Berg 1993).

Capacity Development: For the purpose of this study, we understand “capacity development” in the sense described below.

Capacity can be developed at the individual, institutional and systemic levels. In its broadest sense, capacity is a direct measure of success that an agent (an individual, institution or system) is likely to have in fulfilling an objective. Therefore, in this sense, a “fully capable” agent will, by definition, fully achieve the set objective. There is a more limited sense in which “capacity” means only skills and information, but does not include inclination, motivation or external factors, all of which can individually or collectively inhibit the proper use of skills and information. In this study we use capacity in its widest sense.

In this sense the term capacity includes:

- Clarity about mandates and objectives
- Clarity about methods
- Ability to use the methods to achieve the objectives, in terms of
 - The required skills
 - The required information or knowledge
 - The appropriate attitude or orientation
 - The required support and authority, and the enabling environment
- The inclination and motivation to do what is required to achieve these objectives

Of course, there could be emergencies where it is not advisable to wait for local capacity to develop before acting. However, in all such cases there must be a genuine and concurrent effort to transfer appropriate expertise and capacity for preventing and managing such emergencies (and for further developing such capacities) to local institutions and individuals.

In the ultimate analysis, the whole effort of TCIs is, or at least should be, to build local capacities at all relevant levels. However, the focus on capacity development is difficult to maintain. For one, capacities are among the most difficult things to measure. Therefore, there is a natural temptation to create some “tangible assets” that can be measured and assessed, rather than focus on the less measurable.

Is developed capacity used?

In a recent meeting at Beijing, where representatives of various countries had gathered to discuss capacity development, an interesting dilemma was posed. In many countries training programs are poorly or inappropriately attended. This is because most agencies do not value training and, when asked to depute an officer for training, either send no one or depute those who are least useful and whose absence will not disrupt the work. On the other hand, if it is a high profile training program, organized by a donor agency, in a fancy location, then the influential and the senior get themselves nominated. They are invariably not the ones actually working in the field and needing the training, for their seniority, or their influence, has already ensured for them a cushy headquarters job!

Also, for specific capacities to be built, certain preconditions have to be satisfied. There has to be the availability of fundamental capacities (linguistic, computational etc.) on which further capacities can be built. In many societies these are not available and developing them is a long-term task. Where there are major social stratifications, the focus on immediate capacity development might favor the already better off at the cost of the poorest.

There has to be an incentive for potential beneficiaries to develop their capacities. Where there are no financial or career advantages linked to capacity development, or where the capacity developed cannot be sustained or updated, not much value is put on capacity development. Also, where individual capacities are developed in isolation, without developing the appropriate institutional and systemic capacities, these never get used nor are they valued. Therefore, capacity development must be done at all levels, appropriately and concurrently.

Chapter - 6 - RECOMMENDATIONS

Most of the recommendations that need to be made are implicit in the earlier chapters. Chapter one recommends a definition of ownership and a classification and profile of stakeholders. Chapter 2 lists the important issues that TCI modalities must address if the ownership base is to be expanded and made more appropriate. Chapter 3 lists all those factors that inhibit appropriate ownership of various stakeholders and should, therefore, be avoided. Chapter 4 lists out some of the new and changing TCI modalities that need to be encouraged, developed and more widely applied. Chapter 5 gives a summary of the critical factors that need to be focused on. Therefore, what follows is just the highlighting and detailing of some of the more important, and perhaps less often repeated, steps that need to be taken.

6.1 Involving Stakeholders

Whereas much progress seems to have been made in involving some categories of stakeholders in the process of planning and implementation, some other critical stakeholders still seem to be left out. These include those who are adversely affected and those who are historically disempowered. Towards this end, it is recommended that:

a) Prior to the design and implementation of a TCI, a detailed matrix of stakeholders be prepared, as suggested in 1.2 above and in annex 3,²⁸ and it be ensured that there is adequate representation of all these stakeholders in the process of planning and implementation. Special focus should be given to the participation of women and of other disempowered groups and to those who could be the innocent victims. For the purpose, each TCI should be accompanied by a “class-benefit” analysis to determine who pays the costs and who reaps the benefits. This analysis should also be used as one of the methods for determining the social and cultural viability and optimality of the TCI.

²⁸ Also see annex 9 for a possible matrix format.

b) Where, for reasons discussed earlier, there is a problem in directly involving local communities, an effective way of hearing and understanding their views, without necessarily ruffling government feathers, could be to use alternate channels of information. NGOs, academics and social activists, and other interested groups and individuals, should be supported to periodically carry out a survey of the status, needs, priorities and preferred intervention strategies of the common people, especially the disempowered. The findings could be published and updated on a regular basis and would form a good knowledge base for donors and governments. Such a survey should not be linked to any particular TCI or donor and should, as far as possible, be carried out by nationals, should incorporate all significant points of view and should also try and involve government functionaries (For an example of such a method, see box in section 3.3 above, on listening to unheard voices, and annex 8).

6.2 Empowering Stakeholders

Whereas the participation of stakeholders in the process of design and implementation has been accepted, their empowerment is still not widely evident. There appear to be many constraints to this. It is, therefore recommended that:

a) Every TCI design process should have an inbuilt mechanism for conflict resolution. Such a mechanism should be invariably used to resolve conflicts between different stakeholders, especially among donors and national stakeholders (see annex 3). Donors, rather than setting themselves up as arbitrators, should participate in such a conflict resolution exercise as equals.

b) As an essential precondition, there must be a decentralized and flexible decision-making process. Towards this end, TCIs can adopt a method of "indicative planning" where the actual plan emerges in the process of implementation and the initial, pre-implementation, plan only specifies the broad objectives and values, and the process

of detailed planning (See box on Decentralized Planning in 2.2 above).

Alternatively, there is the framework approach (Gomes et al nd), where a broad framework is agreed upon, setting only general targets, and priorities and budgets are reviewed during the implementation (Dutch intervention in Rwanda and Canadian intervention in Congo and Rwanda). However, adequate safeguards, like the infusion of transparency, need to be established in order to ensure that decentralization and flexibility does not lead to distortions due to political pressures

c) The principle of local answerability should be incorporated in all TCIs as a critical precondition to stakeholder ownership. Where existing circumstances do not immediately permit such answerability, it should be the donor's responsibility to first help set up such a system, rather than itself take on the responsibility of monitoring. Only in emergencies can this rule be ignored, but then also a concurrent effort must be made to ensure the widening of ownership. In the final analysis, the objective should be to promote accountability of the national government and the donor to the people of the recipient country, rather than the current model where the government is accountable to the donor, and the donor to only its own government.

d) While pursuing the changeover from projects to programs or sector wide approaches,, there must also be a further shift, where appropriate, from sector wide approaches to an integrated and multi-sectoral area approach. This would go a long way in addressing root causes and in minimizing the number of innocent victims.

e) The setting up of area trust funds to give the required flexibility and local ownership for funds flow would also be a desirable innovation. Similarly, the move must be away from expatriate consultants to national ones, and from exorbitantly funded projects and programs, to frugal ones.

f) The other preconditions for stakeholder ownership, listed in 2 above, should also be scrupulously fulfilled.

6.3 Capacity Development

Of the three major constraints listed in 5 above, those relating to political and commercial interests of donors and national governments cannot be tackled by mere modalities. The insistence on transparency, on local answerability and on donor participation in conflict resolution exercises can make things more difficult for donors and national governments. However, the third critical constraint, namely that of capacities, needs to be addressed here²⁹. Accordingly, it is recommended that:

a) The initiation of a TCI must be preceded by a capacity needs assessment to determine the current status, gaps and development potential of TCI design and implementation capacity. This should cover systems, institutions and individuals, both within the donor³⁰ and in the host country³¹

b) Where adequate capacities do not exist, the first phase of a TCI must be exclusively a capacity development phase and its successful completion must be a precondition to the launching of the second, more diverse, phase.

c) It is not enough to just help develop capacities, the capacity to develop and update capacities, and to further develop the existing ones, must also be developed.

²⁹ For a more detailed discussion of capacity development imperatives, see Singh and Volonte 2001, and Zakri, Singh and Villarin, 2000.

³⁰ It is often argued that systems within donor agencies and countries do not permit donors to move towards appropriate ownership.

³¹ See annex 10 for an example of a matrix.

ANNEX – 1: Assessment of Stakeholder Participation: A Summary

| No. | Implementing Agencies | Name of TCI | Year | PARTICIPATION OF VARIOUS STAKEHOLDERS | | | | | | | | | |
|-----|-----------------------|---|------|---------------------------------------|-------|--------------------------------------|------------------|-----------|-------|--------------|-------|----------------|-------|
| | | | | National governments | | Scientific institutions/ individuals | | NGOs | | Local people | | Private sector | |
| | | | | Relevance ³² | Level | Relevance | Level | Relevance | Level | Relevance | Level | Relevance | Level |
| 1. | UNDP | Soil Mapping and Advisory Services. Botswana. | 81 | 3 | 2 | 31+ | | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA |
| 2. | UNDP | Bangladesh: Horticulture Research and Development Project | 87 | 3 | 1 | NA | NA | 3 | 0 | 3 | 0 | NA | NA |
| 3. | UNDP | Bangladesh : Assisting Transformation to Irrigated Agriculture | 89 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 3 | 0 |
| 4. | UNDP | Bangladesh:Improvement of Flood Forecasting and Warning System | 89 | 3 | 1 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 2 | NA | NA |
| 5. | UNDP | Pakistan: Suketar Watershed Management Project | 89 | 3 | 2 | NA | NA | NA | NA | 3 | 2 | NA | NA |
| 6. | UNDP | Institutional Support for the Protection of East African Biodiversity (Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda) | 91 | 3 | 2 | 3 | NK ³³ | 3 | 2 | 3 | 1 | NK | NA |

³² Relevance = How important that particular stakeholder is to the specific TCI

³³ NK = not known ie. on the basis of the available document, it is not possible to comment on the presence or level of participation of the stakeholder in question

| PARTICIPATION OF VARIOUS STAKEHOLDERS | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---------------------------------------|-----------------------|--|------|-------------------------|-------|--------------------------------------|-------|-----------|-------|--------------|-------|----------------|-------|
| No. | Implementing Agencies | Name of TCI | Year | National governments | | Scientific institutions/ individuals | | NGOs | | Local people | | Private sector | |
| | | | | Relevance ³² | Level | Relevance | Level | Relevance | Level | Relevance | Level | Relevance | Level |
| 7. | UNDP | South Pacific Biodiversity Conservation Programme (Palau, Micronesia, Nauru, Vanuatu, Solomon Islands, Tuvalu, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Fiji, Tonga, Niue, Cook Islands, Samoa, Tokelau, PNG) | 91 | 32+ | NK | NK | | 3 | 3 | 32+ | NA | NA | |
| 8. | UNDP | Conservation of Biodiversity in the Choco region: Colombia | 91 | 3 | NK | 21+ | | NK | NK | 32+ | NA | NA | |
| 9. | UNDP | Conservation of Biodiversity through Effective Management of Wildlife Trade: Gabon | 91 | 3 | 0 | NA | NA | NA | NA | 3 | 0 | NA | NA |
| 10. | UNDP | Programme for Sustainable Forestry (Iwokrama Rain Forest): Guyana | 91 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | NA | NA |
| 11. | UNDP | Strengthening of National Capacity and Grassroots In-Situ Conservation for Sustainable Biodiversity Protection: Lebanon | 91 | 32+ | | 32+ | | 32+ | | 3 | NK | NK | NK |

| PARTICIPATION OF VARIOUS STAKEHOLDERS | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---------------------------------------|-----------------------|---|------|-------------------------|-------|--------------------------------------|-------|-----------|-------|--------------|-------|----------------|-------|
| No. | Implementing Agencies | Name of TCI | Year | National governments | | Scientific institutions/ individuals | | NGOs | | Local people | | Private sector | |
| | | | | Relevance ³² | Level | Relevance | Level | Relevance | Level | Relevance | Level | Relevance | Level |
| 12. | UNDP | Biodiversity Conservation In the Darien Region: Panama | 91 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 1 | 3 | 0 | NA | NA |
| 13. | UNDP | Sri Lanka: Marine Fisheries Management | 91 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 2 | NK | 3 | 2 | 3 | NK |
| 14. | WB | El Kala National Park and Wetlands Management: Algeria. | 91 | 3 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 0 | NA |
| 15. | WB | Trust Fund for Environmental Conservation: Bhutan | 91 | 3 | 3 | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA |
| 16. | WB | Brazilian Biodiversity Fund Project | 91 | 3 | 3 | NA | NA | 2 | 2 | NA | NA | 2 | 2 |
| 17. | WB | National Biodiversity Project, Brazil | 91 | 3 | 1 | NA | NA | NK | NK | NK | NK | NA | NA |
| 18. | WB | Wildlands Protection and Management: Congo | 91 | 3 | 1+ | 0 | NA | 3 | 2+ | 3 | 2+ | 3 | 2+ |
| 19. | WB | Tana River National Primate Reserve | 91 | 3 | 1 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 0 | 3 | 1 | NA | NA |
| 20. | WB | Wildlife and Protected Areas Conservation: Lao PDR | 91 | 3 | 1 | NK | NK | NK | NK | 3 | 1 | NA | NA |
| 21. | WB | Protected Areas Programme: Mexico | 91 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | NK | NK | NA | NA |
| 22. | WB | Conservation of Priority Protected Areas: Philippines | 91 | 3 | 2 | NK | NK | NK | NK | 3 | 2 | 3 | 1 |

| PARTICIPATION OF VARIOUS STAKEHOLDERS | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---------------------------------------|-----------------------|--|------|-------------------------|-------|--------------------------------------|-------|-----------|-------|--------------|-------|----------------|-------|
| No. | Implementing Agencies | Name of TCI | Year | National governments | | Scientific institutions/ individuals | | NGOs | | Local people | | Private sector | |
| | | | | Relevance ³² | Level | Relevance | Level | Relevance | Level | Relevance | Level | Relevance | Level |
| 23. | WB | Forest Biodiversity Protection: Poland | 91 | 3 | 1 | NA | NA | 3 | 1 | NK | NK | NA | NA |
| 24. | WB | Bwindi Impenetrable National Park and Gorilla Conservation: Uganda | 91 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 2+ | 3 | 2 | NA | NA |
| 25. | UNDP | Patagonian Coastal Zone Management Plan : Argentina. | 92 | 2 | NK | 3 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | NA | NA |
| 26. | UNDP | Sustainable Development and Management of Biologically diverse Coastal Resources: Belize | 92 | 3 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 1 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 0 |
| 27. | UNDP | Conservation of Biodiversity and Sustainable Development in La Amistad and La Osa Conservation Areas: Costa Rica | 92 | 2 | 0+ | 3 | 2 | 3 | 1 | 3 | 1 | NA | NA |
| 28. | UNDP | Protecting Biodiversity and Establishing Sustainable Development in the Sabana-Camaguey Ecosystem: Cuba | 92 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 0 | NA | NK | NK | 0 | NA |

| PARTICIPATION OF VARIOUS STAKEHOLDERS | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---------------------------------------|-----------------------|--|------|-------------------------|-------|--------------------------------------|-------|-----------|-------|--------------|-------|----------------|-------|
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| | | | | Relevance ³² | Level | Relevance | Level | Relevance | Level | Relevance | Level | Relevance | Level |
| 29. | UNDP | Biodiversity Conservation and Management in the Coastal Zone of the Dominican Republic | 92 | 3 | 3 | NK | NK | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | NA | NA |
| 30. | UNDP | Conservation of the Dana and Azraq PAs: Jordan | 92 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 2 | NA | NA |
| 31. | UNDP | Biodiversity Conservation: Nepal | 92 | 3 | 2 | NK | NK | 3 | 2 | 3 | 2+ | NA | NA |
| 32. | UNDP | Maintaining Biodiversity with Rural Community Development: Pakistan | 92 | 3 | 2+ | NK | 2+ | 3 | NK | 3 | 3 | NA | NA |
| 33. | UNDP | Biodiversity Conservation and Resource Management: Papua New Guinea | 92 | 3 | 1 | NK | NK | NK | NK | 3 | 2 | NA | NA |
| 34. | UNDP | Wildlife Conservation and Protected Areas Management. Sri Lanka | 92 | 3 | 1 | 3 | 2+ | 1 | 1 | NA | NA | NA | NA |
| 35. | UNDP | conservation of Biodiversity in the Eastern Wetlands: Uruguay | 92 | 3 | 2 | NK | NK | 3 | 2 | 3 | 2 | NA | NA |
| 36. | WB | Forest Biodiversity Protection: Belarus | 92 | 3 | 3 | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA |

| PARTICIPATION OF VARIOUS STAKEHOLDERS | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---------------------------------------|-----------------------|--|------|-------------------------|-------|--------------------------------------|-------|-----------|-------|--------------|-------|----------------|-------|
| No. | Implementing Agencies | Name of TCI | Year | National governments | | Scientific institutions/ individuals | | NGOs | | Local people | | Private sector | |
| | | | | Relevance ³² | Level | Relevance | Level | Relevance | Level | Relevance | Level | Relevance | Level |
| 37. | WB | Biodiversity Conservation: Bolivia | 92 | 3 | 3 | NA | NA | NA | NA | 3 | 2 | NA | NA |
| 38. | WB | Biodiversity Protection: Czech Republic | 92 | 3 | 1 | NK | NK | 2 | 3 | NK | NK | NA | NA |
| 39. | WB | Biodiversity Protection: Ecuador | 92 | 3 | 1 | NK | NK | 3 | 2 | 3 | 1 | NA | NA |
| 40. | WB | Red Sea Coastal and Marine Resource Management: Egypt | 92 | NK | NK | NK | NK | NK | NK | NK | NK | NK | NK |
| 41. | WB | Coastal Wetlands Management: Ghana | 92 | 3 | 1+ | 3 | 1+ | 3 | 1+ | 3 | 1+ | NA | NA |
| 42. | WB | Biodiversity Conservation: Indonesia | 92 | 3 | 2+ | 3 | 2+ | 3 | 2+ | NA | NA | NA | NA |
| 43. | WB | Lake Malawi/Nyasa Biodiversity Conservation: Malawi | 92 | 3 | 1+ | 3 | 1+ | NA | NA | 3 | 1 | NA | NA |
| 44. | WB | Danube Delta Biodiversity Project. Romania | 92 | 3 | 2+ | 3 | 2+ | 3 | 2+ | 2 | 1 | NA | NA |
| 45. | WB | Biodiversity Conservation and Marine Pollution Abatement: Seychelles | 92 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 1 | NK | NK | 3 | 2 | NK | NK |
| 46. | WB | Biodiversity Protection: Slovak Republic | 92 | 3 | 2 | NK | NK | 2 | 1 | 2 | 1 | NK | NK |

| PARTICIPATION OF VARIOUS STAKEHOLDERS | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---------------------------------------|-----------------------|---|------|-------------------------|-------|--------------------------------------|-------|-----------|-------|--------------|-------|----------------|-------|
| No. | Implementing Agencies | Name of TCI | Year | National governments | | Scientific institutions/ individuals | | NGOs | | Local people | | Private sector | |
| | | | | Relevance ³² | Level | Relevance | Level | Relevance | Level | Relevance | Level | Relevance | Level |
| 47. | WB | In Situ Conservation of Genetic Biodiversity: Turkey | 92 | 3 | 1+ | 3 | 1+ | 3 | 1+ | NA | NA | NA | NA |
| 48. | WB | Danube Delta Biodiversity: Ukraine | 92 | 3 | 2 | NK | NK | 2 | 1 | 3 | 1+ | NK | NK |
| 49. | WB | Transcarpathian Biodiversity Protection: Ukraine | 92 | 3 | 3 | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA |
| 50. | UNDP | Conservation Strategies for Rhinos in South East Asia (Indonesia, Malaysia) | 93 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 3 | NA | NA |
| 51. | UNDP | Optimising Biological Diversity within Wildlife Ranching Systems; a Pilot Demonstration in a Semi Arid Zone: Burkina Faso | 93 | 3 | 0 | NA | NA | 2 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 3 | 0 |
| 52. | UNDP | Control of Exotic Aquatic Weeds in Rivers and Coastal Lagoons to Enhance Biodiversity: Cote d'Ivoire | 93 | 3 | 2 | NK | NK | NK | NK | NK | NK | NK | NK |

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|---------------------------------------|-----------------------|---|------|-------------------------|-------|--------------------------------------|-------|-----------|-------|--------------|-------|----------------|-------|
| No. | Implementing Agencies | Name of TCI | Year | National governments | | Scientific institutions/ individuals | | NGOs | | Local people | | Private sector | |
| | | | | Relevance ³² | Level | Relevance | Level | Relevance | Level | Relevance | Level | Relevance | Level |
| 53. | UNDP | A Dynamic Farmer Based Approach to the Conservation of African Plant Genetic Resources: Ethiopia | 93 | 3 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 32+ | NA | NA | |
| 54. | UNDP | Restoration of Highly Degraded and Threatened Forests in Mauritius: Mauritius | 93 | 32+ | | 32+ | | 2 | 3 | NK | NK | 1 | 2 |
| 55. | UNDP | Mongolia Biodiversity Project | 93 | 32+ | NK | NK | | 32+ | | 32+ | NK | NK | |
| 56. | UNEP | Global Biodiversity Assessment | 93 | NA | NA | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | NA | NA | NA | NA |
| 57. | WB | West Africa Pilot Community Based Natural Resource and Wildlife Management (Burkina Faso and Cote d'Ivoire) | 93 | 3 | 2 | NA | NA | 0 | NK | 3 | 2 | NA | NA |
| 58. | WB | Biodiversity Conservation and Management: Cameroon | 93 | 3 | 2 | NA | NA | 3 | 2 | 3 | 2 | NA | NA |
| 59. | WB | Transfrontier Conservation Areas. Pilot and Institutional Strengthening: Mozambique | 93 | 3 | 1 | NK | NK | 2 | 1 | 3 | 1 | NA | NA |

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| No. | Implementing Agencies | Name of TCI | Year | National governments | | Scientific institutions/ individuals | | NGOs | | Local people | | Private sector | |
| | | | | Relevance ³² | Level | Relevance | Level | Relevance | Level | Relevance | Level | Relevance | Level |
| 60. | UNDP | Kazakstan: The Aral Seashore Rehabilitation and Capacity Building Programme (Help the People of Aral to Help Themselves) | 94 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 1+ | NK | NK | 3 | 2+ | NK | NK |
| 61. | UNDP | A Highly Decentralised Approach to Biodiversity Protection and Use: The Bangassou Dense Forest: Central African Republic | 95 | 3 | 3 | NK | NK | 3 | 1 | 3 | 3 | NK | MK |
| 62. | UNDP | Integrated Biodiversity Protection in Sarstun-Motagua Region: Guatemala | 95 | 3 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 3 | 1 | NA | NA |
| 63. | UNDP | Regional Support for the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Natural resources in the Amazon: Latin American Countries | 95 | 3 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 3 | 1 | NA | NA |
| 64. | UNDP | Egyptian Red Sea Coastal and Marine Resource Management Project | 95 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 2 | NK |

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| No. | Implementing Agencies | Name of TCI | Year | National governments | | Scientific institutions/ individuals | | NGOs | | Local people | | Private sector | |
| | | | | Relevance ³² | Level | Relevance | Level | Relevance | Level | Relevance | Level | Relevance | Level |
| 65. | UNDP | Bangladesh. Integrated pest management | 95 | 3 | 2+ | NA | NA | 3 | 2+ | NA | NA | NA | NA |
| 66. | UNDP | Bangladesh: Utilisation of Agro Ecological Zones Database and Installation of GIS for Agricultural Development | 95 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 2 | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA |
| 67. | UNDP | China: Preparation of Agenda 21 | 95 | 3 | 2 | 3 | NK | 3 | 1+ | 3 | 2 | NK | NK |
| 68. | WB | Nature Reserves Management: China | 95 | 3 | 3 | NK | NK | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | NA | NA |
| 69. | WB | India Ecodevelopment Project: (India) | 95 | 3 | 1 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 1 | 3 | 1+ | NA | NA |
| 70. | WB | Kerinci Seblat ICDP: Indonesia | 95 | 3 | 1 | 2 | NK | NK | NK | 3 | 1 | 3 | 1 |
| 71. | WB | Biodiversity Restoration: Mauritius | 95 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 2+ | 3 | 2+ | NK | NK | 3 | 2+ |
| 72. | WB | National Trust Fund for Protected Areas: Peru | 95 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 2 |
| 73. | WB | Biodiversity Conservation: Russian Federation | 95 | 3 | 1 | NK | NK | 3 | 2 | 3 | 2 | NK | NK |

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|---------------------------------------|-----------------------|--|------|-------------------------|-------|--------------------------------------|-------|-----------|-------|------------------|-------|----------------|-------|
| No. | Implementing Agencies | Name of TCI | Year | National governments | | Scientific institutions/ individuals | | NGOs | | Local people | | Private sector | |
| | | | | Relevance ³² | Level | Relevance | Level | Relevance | Level | Relevance | Level | Relevance | Level |
| 74. | UNDP | Inventory, Evaluation and Monitoring of Botanical Diversity in Southern Africa: A regional Capacity and institution building Network(Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, South Africa, Zambia, Zimbabwe) | 96 | 2 ³⁴ | 1 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 0 | NA ³⁵ | NA | NA | NA |
| 75. | UNDP | Island Biodiversity and Participatory Conservation in the Federal Islamic Republic of Comoros | 96 | 3 | 2+ | NA | 0 | 2 | 1+ | 3 | 3 | 2 | 1+ |
| 76. | UNDP | Advocacy and Capacity Building in Environmental Aspects of Energy: Establishment of UNESCO chair at University of Alexandria. Egypt | 96 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 2 | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA |

³⁴ 0= Absent; 1=Little; 2=Moderate; 3=Extensive

³⁵ NA = Not applicable

| PARTICIPATION OF VARIOUS STAKEHOLDERS | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
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| No. | Implementing Agencies | Name of TCI | Year | National governments | | Scientific institutions/ individuals | | NGOs | | Local people | | Private sector | |
| | | | | Relevance ³² | Level | Relevance | Level | Relevance | Level | Relevance | Level | Relevance | Level |
| 77. | UNDP | Capacity Building for Egypt to Respond to UNFCCC Communications Obligations | 96 | 3 | 2 | 3 | NK | 3 | NK | NA | NA | NA | NA |
| 78. | UNDP | China: Capacity Building for Widespread Adoption of Clean Production for Air Pollution Control in Benxi | 96 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 3 | 0 |
| 79. | UNDP | Capacity Building for Integrated Coastal Management in Northern South China Sea. China | 96 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 3 | 0 |
| 80. | UNDP | China: Managing Sustainable Development in Wuhan | 96 | NK | NK | NK | NK | NK | NK | NK | NK | NK | NK |
| 81. | UNDP | Managing Sustainable Development in Shenyang, China | 96 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 3 | 1+ | 3 | 0 |
| 82. | UNDP | Capacity Building of Women Mayors and TVE Managers for Sustainable Development in China | 96 | 2 | 2 | NA | NA | 3 | 2 | 3 | 2 | NA | NA |

| PARTICIPATION OF VARIOUS STAKEHOLDERS | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---------------------------------------|-----------------------|---|------|-------------------------|-------|--------------------------------------|-------|-----------|-------|--------------|-------|----------------|-------|
| No. | Implementing Agencies | Name of TCI | Year | National governments | | Scientific institutions/ individuals | | NGOs | | Local people | | Private sector | |
| | | | | Relevance ³² | Level | Relevance | Level | Relevance | Level | Relevance | Level | Relevance | Level |
| 83. | UNDP | Bolivia: Program of Rural Electrification with Renewable Energy, Using the Popular Participation Law | 96 | 3 | 1 | NA | NA | NA | NA | 3 | 1+ | 3 | 1 |
| 84. | UNDP | Brazil: Management of Biological Diversity in Brazil | 96 | 2 | 1+ | 3 | 2 | 2 | 1 | NK | NK | NK | NK |
| 85. | UNDP | Uruguay: Formulation of the National Biodiversity Action Plan and Strategy and Report to the CBD | 96 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 1+ | 3 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 3 | 1 |
| 86. | UNDP | Reducing Biodiversity Loss at Cross Border Sites in East Africa(Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda) | 97 | 3 | 1 | 1 | NK | 1 | NK | 3 | NK | NA | NA |
| 87. | UNDP | African NGO Government Partnership for Sustainable Biodiversity Action(Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Tanzania, Tunisia, Uganda) | 97 | 3 | 2 | NK | NK | 3 | 2 | 3 | 2 | NA | NA |

| PARTICIPATION OF VARIOUS STAKEHOLDERS | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---------------------------------------|-----------------------|---|------|-------------------------|-------|--------------------------------------|-------|-----------|-------|--------------|-------|----------------|-------|
| No. | Implementing Agencies | Name of TCI | Year | National governments | | Scientific institutions/ individuals | | NGOs | | Local people | | Private sector | |
| | | | | Relevance ³² | Level | Relevance | Level | Relevance | Level | Relevance | Level | Relevance | Level |
| 88. | UNDP | Integrated Management of Jigme Dorji National Park: Bhutan | 97 | 3 | 3 | NA | NA | 2 | 0 | 3 | 2 | NA | NA |
| 89. | UNDP | Consolidation of the Banados del Este Biosphere Reserve. Uruguay | 97 | 3 | 2+ | 3 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 1 | 1 | NK | NK |
| 90. | UNDP | Conservation and Sustainable Use of Biodiversity of Socotra Archipelago. Yemen | 97 | 3 | 2+ | 3 | 2+ | NK | NK | 3 | 2+ | NA | NA |
| 91. | UNDP | First Country Cooperation Framework for Chad | 97 | 3 | 1+ | NA | NA | 3 | 2 | NK | NK | NK | NK |
| 92. | UNDP | First Country Cooperation Framework for Republic of Congo (Zaire) | 97 | 3 | NK | NA | NK | NK | NK | 3 | 0 | NK | NK |
| 93. | UNDP | Capacity Building for the Ministry of State for Environmental Affairs. Egypt | 97 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 2 | NA | NA | NA | NA |
| 94. | UNDP | Egypt: Genetic Engineering: A Technology for Sustainable Agriculture and a safe Environment | 97 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 2 | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA |

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| No. | Implementing Agencies | Name of TCI | Year | National governments | | Scientific institutions/ individuals | | NGOs | | Local people | | Private sector | |
| | | | | Relevance ³² | Level | Relevance | Level | Relevance | Level | Relevance | Level | Relevance | Level |
| 95. | UNDP | First Country Cooperation Framework for Gabon. | 97 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 1 |
| 96. | UNDP | Capacity Building for the Rapid Commercialization of Renewable Energy. China | 97 | 3 | 1 | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | 3 | 1 |
| 97. | UNDP | Armenia: Strengthening the Management Structure of the Ministry of Environment | 97 | 3 | 2 | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA |
| 98. | UNDP | Bulgaria: Capacity Building for a Sustainable Development at National and Community Levels | 97 | 3 | 2 | NK | NK | 3 | 2 | 3 | 2 | NK | NK |
| 99. | UNDP | Capacity Building for the Implementation of Agenda 21 in Estonia | 97 | 3 | 2 | NA | NA | 3 | 2 | 3 | 2 | NK | NK |
| 100. | UNDP | Kazakstan: Assistance to the Government of Kazakhstan in the Development of a Strategy to Implement the Convention on Biological Diversity. | 97 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 1+ | 3 | 1+ | 3 | 1+ | 3 | 1+ |

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| No. | Implementing Agencies | Name of TCI | Year | National governments | | Scientific institutions/ individuals | | NGOs | | Local people | | Private sector | |
| | | | | Relevance ³² | Level | Relevance | Level | Relevance | Level | Relevance | Level | Relevance | Level |
| 101 | UNDP | Latvia: Development of National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan | 97 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 3 | NK |
| 102 | UNDP | Brazil: National Biological Diversity Strategy and Report to the CBD | 97 | 3 | 2+ | 3 | 2+ | 3 | 2+ | 3 | 2+ | 3 | 2+ |
| 103 | UNDP | Belize: Formulation of the National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan | 97 | 3 | 2 | 3 | NK | 3 | 2 | 3 | NK | 3 | NK |
| 104 | UNDP | Fiji: : Formulation of the National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan and Report to the COP | 97 | 3 | 2+ | 3 | 2+ | 3 | 2+ | 3 | 2+ | 3 | 2+ |
| 105 | UNDP | St. Vincent: Water Resource Development and Management | 97 | 3 | 2+ | NK | NK | NK | NK | 3 | 0 | 3 | 0 |
| 106 | UNDP/WB | Honduras Biodiversity Project: Honduras | 97 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | NA | NA |
| 107 | UNDP/WB | Environment Programme Support: Madagascar | 97 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 1 | NK | NK | 3 | 1 | NK | NK |
| 108 | UNEP | People, Land Management and Environmental Change: Global | 97 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 1 | 3 | 1 | NA | NA |

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|---------------------------------------|-----------------------|---|------|-------------------------|-------|--------------------------------------|-------|-----------|-------|--------------|-------|----------------|-------|
| No. | Implementing Agencies | Name of TCI | Year | National governments | | Scientific institutions/ individuals | | NGOs | | Local people | | Private sector | |
| | | | | Relevance ³² | Level | Relevance | Level | Relevance | Level | Relevance | Level | Relevance | Level |
| 109 | WB | Central African Region: Regional Environment and Information Management Project (Cameroon, CAR, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Congo) | 97 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 3 | NA | NA | 3 | 3 |
| 110 | WB | Biodiversity Conservation Project: Argentina | 97 | 3 | 1 | NK | NK | NK | NK | 3 | 2 | NA | NA |
| 111 | WB | Coral reef Rehabilitation and Management Project: Indonesia | 97 | 3 | 1 | 2 | 1 | NK | NK | 3 | 2 | NK | NK |
| 112 | WB | Conservation and Sustainable use of Medicinal Plants. Sri Lanka | 97 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 2 | NA | NA | 3 | 2+ | NA | NA |
| 113 | UNDP | Biodiversity Conservation and Sustainable Livelihood Options in the Grasslands of Eastern Mongolia | 98 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 3 | 2 | NA | NA |
| 114 | UNDP | First Country Cooperation Framework for Algeria | 98 | 3 | 3 | NK | NK | 3 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 2 |

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| | | | | Relevance ³² | Level | Relevance | Level | Relevance | Level | Relevance | Level | Relevance | Level | |
| 115 | UNDP | First Country Cooperation Framework for Bahrain | 98 | NK | NK | NK | NK | NK | NK | NK | NK | NK | NK | |
| 116 | UNDP | Land Use Planning for Sustainable Agriculture Development. Botswana. | 98 | | 32+ | 3 | 2 | 3 | 1 | 3 | NK | NA | NA | |
| 117 | UNDP | First Country Cooperation Framework for Burundi. | 98 | | 3 | NK | NK | 3 | 2 | 3 | 1+ | NK | NK | |
| 118 | UNDP | Integrate the Implementation of Agenda 21 across ministries and various sectors of society. Egypt. | 98 | | 32+ | | 32+ | | 32+ | | 32+ | | 3 | NK |
| 119 | UNDP | Philippines: Conservation of the Tuhbataha Reef National Marine Park | 98 | | 3 | 2 | 32+ | | 32+ | | 32+ | | 32+ | |
| 120 | UNDP | Philippines: Coastal Resources Management and Sustainable Tourism | 98 | | 3 | 2 | NK | NK | NK | | 32+ | | 3 | NK |
| 121 | UNDP | Preparation of a full project for the in-situ conservation and sustainable use of Agrobiodiversity in Armenia | 98 | | 3 | 2 | 3 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 3 | 1 |

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| | | | | Relevance ³² | Level | Relevance | Level | Relevance | Level | Relevance | Level | Relevance | Level |
| 122 | UNDP | Belarus: Sustainable forestry management and reduction of adverse environment impacts by using wood and wood residue resources for production of heat power in Belarus | 98 | 3 | 2 | NK | NK | NK | NK | NK | NK | 3 | 1 |
| 123 | UNDP | Bulgaria: Biodiversity Action Plan | 98 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 3 | NK | NK | NK |
| 124 | UNDP | Georgia: Capacity-Building for the Ministry of Environment. | 98 | 3 | 2 | NK | NK | 3 | 2 | NK | NK | NK | NK |
| 125 | UNDP | Russia: Integrated Conservation of Wetland Biodiversity in the Lower Volga | 98 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 2 | NA | NA |
| 126 | UNEP | Global Biodiversity Forum Phase II | 98 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 2 | NA | NA | NA | NA |
| 127 | UNEP | Development of Best Practices and Dissemination of Lessons Learned for Dealing with the global problem of Alien Species: Global | 98 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 1 | 1 | NA | NA | NA | NA |
| 128 | UNEP | Forest Fires: Indonesia | 98 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 2 | 0 |

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| | | | | Relevance ³² | Level | Relevance | Level | Relevance | Level | Relevance | Level | Relevance | Level |
| 129 | UNEP | Rescue Plan for the Cap Blanc Colony of Monk Seals: Mauritania | 98 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 2+ | NK | NK | 1 | 1 | NA | NA |
| 130 | WB | Cape Peninsula Biodiversity Conservation Project: South Africa | 98 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 2 | NK | NK |
| 131 | UNDP | First Country Cooperation Framework for Cameroon | 99 | 3 | 2+ | NK | NK | NK | NK | 3 | 2+ | NK | NK |
| 132 | UNDP | Uzbekistan: National Biodiversity Strategy for Conservation and Action Plan | 99 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 2 |

ANNEX – 2: Detailed Assessment of Stakeholder Participation and Ownership

| Sn o | Project name, country and implementing agency | Was there stake holder participation? | Were benefit sharing issues addressed? | Were sustainability issues addressed? |
|---------|--|--|--|---|
| 1. | Biodiversity Conservation and Management in the Coastal Zone of the Dominican Republic, UNDP | <p>Here, it should be pointed out that one of the project priorities was stakeholder involvement.</p> <p>The different stakeholder groups of the four pilot areas were fundamental to accomplishment of the project objectives. Their effective involvement has created true ownership.</p> <p>At the national level the project did an outstanding job of integrating the most relevant governmental agencies into the project.</p> | <p>The project did not deal with this explicitly although some communities did discuss the issue and this would be reflected in their management plans. It is noted that in the communities where the discussions were not issue focused a major concern is the non-effectiveness and efficiency of resource management efforts.</p> | <p>This issue of sustainability would have been addressed in the third phase of the project. Given that project activities were compressed into two years it was not possible for the project to reach this phase. The project has, however, played a significant role in creating the preconditions to a potentially significant restructuring of the national institutional framework for</p> |

| Sn o | Project name, country and implementing agency | Was there stake holder participation? | Were benefit sharing issues addressed? | Were sustainability issues addressed? |
|---------|---|---|--|--|
| | | <p>The active involvement of communities in the analysis of management issues and the preparation of management strategies has included large numbers of workshops, training courses and local involvement in surveys.</p> <p>The project has been highly successful in promoting a reputation for transparent and inclusive behavior. This has been expressed by (1) featuring important officials at opening and closing ceremonies of project-sponsored events, (2) including a wide diversity</p> | | <p>ecosystem management and biodiversity conservation.</p> <p>Creation of private sector partnership to promote independent financing of training, public education, and environmentally sensitive economic ventures;</p> <p>The project is in the phase of identifying these interventions (required for sustainability).</p> |

| Sn o | Project name, country and implementing agency | Was there stake holder participation? | Were benefit sharing issues addressed? | Were sustainability issues addressed? |
|---------|--|---|---|--|
| | | of governmental and non-governmental participants in workshops and courses and (3) widely distributing the many documents produced by the project. | | |
| 2. | Biodiversity Conservation Project, Argentina, World Bank | <p>Not very successful up to now. Consultative Commissions will be established in each PA but none have been formed yet.</p> <p>Not clear in the available information. The management approach seems very top-down (federal government establishing the PAs) and the local communities</p> | <p>Workers that previously worked in the purchased lands are now working for the APN.</p> <p>In one of the PAs, residents were provided with wood from exotic forests to substitute the cut of wood from endemic forests.</p> <p>The major goal of the Mitigation Plan (MP) is to minimize the negative</p> | Too early to say. |

| Sn o | Project name, country and implementing agency | Was there stake holder participation? | Were benefit sharing issues addressed? | Were sustainability issues addressed? |
|---------|--|---|--|---|
| | | may accept this. | impacts of park creation on those families and individuals who will be allowed to remain in the park including loss of employment and loss of other amenities provide by the employer. Some examples include: improved housing/sanitation; employee compensation and extension activities. | |
| 3. | Wildlands Protection and Management, Congo, World Bank | Not fully. Government performance: The reviewer is of the opinion that government performance was unsatisfactory. Project objectives and impacts are compromised | Social impact is mixed. Some communities did not agree fully with the concept of the reserves and the potential limitations likely to be imposed to their extractive activities. On the other | The project is rated uncertain on this topic. This is optimistic. In fact, the borrower's comments on the ICR clearly stated that all project activities have stopped as GEF funding ended. The |

| Sn o | Project name, country and implementing agency | Was there stake holder participation? | Were benefit sharing issues addressed? | Were sustainability issues addressed? |
|---------|---|--|---|---|
| | | <p>due to the lack of funding and long-term sustainability, lack political support, poor enabling environment, etc.</p> <p>NGOs, particularly international NGOs seem to have kept the project going and permitted the project to achieve limited but important accomplishments. It is an important lesson for the future.</p> | <p>hand, the project provided some goods (school construction/rehabilitation, pharmacy supplies, etc.) which briefly addressed some of their needs. This is unsustainable however, from the perspective of biodiversity conservation. These are regular development activities that should be covered through baseline funding.</p> <p>Compensation seems to have included paying for regular development work that is usually covered through baseline financing such as schools building or repairs, supplying dispensaries and</p> | <p>report reads: “Lack of financial resources after the project closing has brought activities to a halt” (page 10, para 9, ICR). The only support for some sites comes from the efforts of international NGOs.</p> <p>As mentioned by the various reports, the proposed trust fund to assist the country for long-term funding was cancelled. The Bank should have recognized earlier that biodiversity projects like the one funded are unlikely to be sustained in stagnant or slow-growing economy.</p> |

| Sn o | Project name, country and implementing agency | Was there stake holder participation? | Were benefit sharing issues addressed? | Were sustainability issues addressed? |
|---------|---|---------------------------------------|--|--|
| | | | <p>pharmacies, nurseries for generating plants for reforestation, improve living conditions through awareness campaigns on sustainable management of natural resources, etc.</p> <p>As far as the Reviewer can gather, there were no bio-prospecting activities included</p> | <p>Social sustainability is also a concern. A number of local communities were opposed to the establishing of protected areas as they saw the potential to limit their access to natural resources they commonly used. In addition, government officials seem to be delaying approval of PAs aiming at accessing timber over the long-term.</p> <p>Given social pressures, poor enabling environment, limited progress on achieving project objectives the</p> |

| Sn o | Project name, country and implementing agency | Was there stake holder participation? | Were benefit sharing issues addressed? | Were sustainability issues addressed? |
|---------|---|---|--|---|
| | | | | environmental sustainability is also under question |
| 4. | Red Sea Coastal and Marine Resource Management, Egypt, World Bank | <p>There seems to be excellent inter-ministerial coordination. This is, however, not enough information to assess if there is effective ICZM in the field.</p> <p>Unclear from the documents provided to what extent this project has been developed in a participatory way and what stakeholders have participated in the discussions.</p> | Unclear if the originally planned systems for cost recovery have been established. | No |
| 5. | Coastal Wetlands | An effective on-site | At local level, community | Activities of a project are |

| Sn o | Project name, country and implementing agency | Was there stake holder participation? | Were benefit sharing issues addressed? | Were sustainability issues addressed? |
|---------|---|---|---|---|
| | Management, Ghana, World Bank | <p>collaboration between staff of the Wildlife Department, the Ghana Wildlife Society (GWS) an NGO, and the local communities living in the wetland ecosystems.</p> <p>Empowerment of local communities in the management and utilization of wetland resources.</p> <p>The contribution of the stakeholder groups to the achievement of project objectives was designed in the project. , i.e., The government sector for project management, the scientific community for research and monitoring,</p> | <p>may expect a lot from the project if they are expected to participate in the implementation. Moreover, unless they received direct benefits form their participation, they are reluctant to take part in the project.</p> <p>It is not clear how the benefit sharing is implemented in this project.</p> | <p>often unsustainable due to various reasons, among others, are the availability of human and financial resources. While it is true that instruments to sustain activities of the project are in place (LI and its by-laws) there are, however, evidence that counterpart funds was not sufficiently allocated. Moreover, to maintain trained personnel in their place needs clear vision and cannot be taken for granted. Without serious consideration to the two resources, the continuation of the</p> |

| Sn o | Project name, country and implementing agency | Was there stake holder participation? | Were benefit sharing issues addressed? | Were sustainability issues addressed? |
|---------|---|--|--|---|
| | | <p>the NGO for public awareness, and community involvement for local management.</p> <p>Though in the project design participation of stakeholders is stressed to ensure the feeling of ownership, but in reality stakeholders were hardly considered seriously in the planning of the project. Time may be the limiting factor to involving stakeholders at the planning phase.</p> | | <p>project activities may be at risk.</p> <p>At the community level, people thought that the objective of the project was to construct the public facilities instead of the ecological restoration of the sites. Such misconception can happen easily if communication with them is poor. To sustain the project beyond the World Bank support, stakeholders need involved from the very beginning and continue to be informed as the project is implemented.</p> |

| Sn o | Project name, country and implementing agency | Was there stake holder participation? | Were benefit sharing issues addressed? | Were sustainability issues addressed? |
|---------|---|---|--|---|
| 6. | Integrated Biodiversity Protection in the Sarstun-Motagua Region, Guatemala, UNDP | Although the project document identifies many potential stakeholders their participation is still very limited especially within the objectives of sustainable use. The project needs a strategy based on land use planning that could guide the development of sustainable and market based activities. Mechanisms are being established at the local level for stakeholders participation. At the regional level a Consultative Committee has been established. | Several activities have been developed but without a defined strategy. | Lack of defined regional strategies (RECOsMO) has produced a delay in activities geared towards the identification and capture of additional funding and the establishment of a trust fund. |
| 7. | Biodiversity Collections, Indonesia, World Bank | Partly. The project has successfully involved NGOs in project book publishing, which provides funding outside of the Government budget | NA | Partly. Students returning after training are being employed within the PPPB. For financial sustainability, proposed but not yet implemented. The project includes a study to develop a financing strategy to address financial sustainability after the project period. The Financing Strategy Study will help enable PPPB to obtain the long-term |

| Sn o | Project name, country and implementing agency | Was there stake holder participation? | Were benefit sharing issues addressed? | Were sustainability issues addressed? |
|---------|---|--|--|--|
| | | | | <p>increases in the institutional budget to cover incremental operating costs resulting from the project and the financing required for continued development of BD information.</p> <p>The study has been finalized but its recommendations have not started to be implemented according to the QAG assessment of November 2000. According to the PRODOC, the study should have been ready by mid-project and begin to operationalize immediately. This has not happened.</p> |
| 8. | Biodiversity Collections, Latin American and the Caribbean Region (Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Peru, Suriname, Venezuela), UNDP | Note: The tripartite review conducted in 1994, the second year of the three-year project, noted that two countries (Colombia and Brazil) had not yet even agreed to be part of the regional project! In the PIR of 1997 it is not entirely clear if they ever did participate. | NA | No. |

| Sn o | Project name, country and implementing agency | Was there stake holder participation? | Were benefit sharing issues addressed? | Were sustainability issues addressed? |
|---------|--|--|---|--|
| | | <p>During project design stakeholders involved included 70 institutions in six countries.</p> <p>During project implementation, this participation was strengthened with the formation of representative national biodiversity working groups. In some countries (Bolivia and Peru) more than 40 public, private sector, NGOs and other institutions were involved. The nature of their involvement included:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Participation in project working groups at the national and local level. • Twenty percent of the budget was dedicated to contracts with institutions for execution of activities. • Participation in national, sub-regional and regional seminars and workshops in eight countries. <p>It should be noted that the PIR</p> | | |

| Sn o | Project name, country and implementing agency | Was there stake holder participation? | Were benefit sharing issues addressed? | Were sustainability issues addressed? |
|---------|--|---|---|---|
| | | <p>in 1997 stated that a high percentage of NGOs involved in the project were not representative of the true beneficiaries nor did the NGOs enjoy a close relationship with the beneficiaries (Curiously enough, the PIR does not state who the "true beneficiaries" are).</p> <p>In terms of Subprogramme One, the stakeholders were able to participate extensively in the design and implementation of the activities under this subprogramme and hence had real ownership. It is not clear from the documentation provided to the reviewer if this could be said for the other subprogrammes.</p> | | |
| 9. | Environment Program Support, Madagascar, World Bank/UNDP | As mentioned above some project documents suggest that stakeholder participation is time consuming and that, while participatory approaches are beneficial, the urgent situation in Madagascar does not allow for | Under the output titled "analytical work to support policy reform on tourism taxation" the project attempted to reform taxation policy to ensure that tourism services within a certain distance of a protected area would be | One of the primary foci of the project was the establishment of parks, reserves and gazetted natural forests to preserve Madagascar biodiversity. Within these protected areas the project initiated revenue- |

| Sn o | Project name, country and implementing agency | Was there stake holder participation? | Were benefit sharing issues addressed? | Were sustainability issues addressed? |
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| | | <p>them. Also, the reports indicated that the project reached a very small segment of the population, considering the very large outlays of funds.</p> | <p>subject to concession fees which will be returned to the region. There was also mention of capacity building and development schemes around the perimeter of new and established parks.</p> | <p>raising activities, which included increased entrance fees, development of commercial activities, and privately supported trust funds. These activities may lead to sustainability in the long term, however, as stated in the project document, GEF and other grant funds are required to sustain the network of protected areas in the short and medium run.</p> |
| 10 | Wildlife Conservation and Protected Areas Management, Sri Lanka, UNDP | <p>Partly. Community participation was not obvious.</p> <p>“The project was designed to build the technical capacity and the cadre of the DWLC to conserve biodiversity. Hence, the DWLC was THE key stakeholder group and was actively involved in the entire project. Except for some members of senior management as highlighted above, all staff contributed fully and</p> | <p>The reviewer says – not applicable. However, given the objectives of the project, it would be applicable and the fact that ecocodevelopment plans were made suggests that these issues were being looked at to some extent.</p> | <p>No. To promote sustainability and encourage a broadening of the scope of work of a recipient institution (DWLC in this case) to more innovative and less conventional activities (e.g., infrastructure development), government counterpart funds should be allocated proportionately across all project-supported activities that are expected to continue after the project end.</p> |

| Sn o | Project name, country and implementing agency | Was there stake holder participation? | Were benefit sharing issues addressed? | Were sustainability issues addressed? |
|---------|---|---|--|--|
| | | <p>enthusiastically to the achievement of the project objectives through their participation in training, the conduct of resource inventories, development of PA management plans and the ecodevelopment plans, etc.”</p> | | <p>Disproportionate or lopsided investment of government counterpart funds detracts from sustainability.</p> <p>In cases where project funds exceed the core budgets of the institutions that they are intended to assist, sustainability must be a primary consideration built into project design. A phased approach to project funding, decreasing project funds, while increasing government and other contributions over the life of the project should be adopted to promote sustainable funding for project-initiated or project-supported activities that require continuation after project end. This ensures government commitment and makes it easier to request funds from Treasury.</p> <p>To promote sustainability, all units (e.g. GIS team) established with the assistance</p> |

| Sn o | Project name, country and implementing agency | Was there stake holder participation? | Were benefit sharing issues addressed? | Were sustainability issues addressed? |
|---------|---|---------------------------------------|--|---|
| | | | | <p>of the project should be physically located within the institution and staff for these new units should be recruited by the institution. If this is not possible at the start of the project, at the very least, government counterpart funds should pay the person's salary until such time she or he can be officially recruited into the institution.</p> <p>The final evaluation cited the failure to incorporate mechanisms within the project design to promote sustainability of project-initiated and project-supported activities after the project was finished as a fundamental design shortcoming. For example, at the time of the final evaluation with only 5 months of the project left, no line item had been created in the Government budget for training, which was a central</p> |

| Sn o | Project name, country and implementing agency | Was there stake holder participation? | Were benefit sharing issues addressed? | Were sustainability issues addressed? |
|---------|---|---------------------------------------|--|--|
| | | | | <p>and successful aspect of the project. This has made the DWLC entirely dependent on outside resources to support training. In addition, DWLC invests a vast majority of their funding in infrastructure development and during the project this remained the case. As a result at project end DWLC will most likely continue to ignore the financial resources required to support other PA management needs such as were identified in the development of the PA management plans. Finally, DWLC returned 18% of their last budget to treasury and of course this doesn't contribute to post-project sustainability. The project suggested changes in disbursement practices to avoid this problem but they were rebuffed along with the overall restructuring that was suggested for DWLC.</p> |

| Sn o | Project name, country and implementing agency | Was there stake holder participation? | Were benefit sharing issues addressed? | Were sustainability issues addressed? |
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| | | | | <p>On a brighter note, at the time of the written evaluation, ADB expressed interest in supporting the implementation of the PA management plans (US\$20 million) that were developed by the project. However, ADB imposed a condition on the investment that being the requirement for institutional reforms within DWLC. No word in the documentation if this ever came to pass.</p> |
| 11 | Biodiversity Conservation in Nepal, UNDP | <p>Most stakeholders appear to have been actively involved at the implementation and evaluation stages but it is not possible to say the level of involvement at planning stage where it appears that the main executing agencies were the primary participants along with UNDP.</p> | <p>The modalities of benefit sharing with the local communities in the buffer zones and within the MBNPCA is not described in the available documentation and has been treated only anecdotally. Nor does the documentation provide in quantitative terms the monetary benefits that local communities and individuals have accrued.</p> | <p>This could only really be evaluated in the context of Component Two after the project has been closed for some time.</p> <p>Unfortunately, the answer to this question is most likely no, but a definitive answer would require a follow-up visit. The original project design never made allowances for addressing sustainability</p> |

| Sn o | Project name, country and implementing agency | Was there stake holder participation? | Were benefit sharing issues addressed? | Were sustainability issues addressed? |
|---------|--|--|---|---|
| | | | | <p>(particularly financial) of any of the project components once project funding was over and the allowances listed below appear to have been made on the fly and not as part of any conscious design.</p> <p>For component one, the NBAP cannot really be evaluated in terms of its sustainability as it is in essence a one-off activity and should be evaluated as to whether it will have lasting impact. It is too early to say if it will.</p> <p>For component two, the protected area management system had been established at MBNPCA by the time of the final evaluation, but all of the components programmatic activities were entirely dependent on project funds. HMG/Nepal indicated that it would be able to support enough staff there to maintain the standard level of park</p> |

| Sn o | Project name, country and implementing agency | Was there stake holder participation? | Were benefit sharing issues addressed? | Were sustainability issues addressed? |
|---------|--|--|---|---|
| | | | | <p>management that HMG maintains throughout the country. It is not apparent if this level of staffing would be adequate to maintain the existing level of programs but it seems unlikely. Locally recruited and trained staff represented one of the most important investments in human resources vis-à-vis sustainability for the management of the PA. HMG promised to transfer as many of these people into Government-funded positions as was possible, however, from the available documentation it is unclear whether this promise was kept.</p> <p>At the time of the final evaluation it was not possible to assess the sustainability of the grazing management systems and the grazing management partnership established between the GUGs</p> |

| Sn o | Project name, country and implementing agency | Was there stake holder participation? | Were benefit sharing issues addressed? | Were sustainability issues addressed? |
|---------|---|---------------------------------------|--|---|
| | | | | <p>and the Park.</p> <p>At the time of the final evaluation, the tourism work conducted in component two could not be called sustainable even though a substantial amount of the foundation was established for sustainable tourism that could generate revenues for the Park and local people. Unfortunately, the project design failed to consider strategies for revenue-sharing and assessing how much money the Park needed to be financially sustainable and what percentage of that amount could be supplied by tourism.</p> <p>No sustainability analysis was ever conducted of what the project would require to sustain project-inspired programs and activities for all components and in particular for component two where sustainability issues are the</p> |

| Sn o | Project name, country and implementing agency | Was there stake holder participation? | Were benefit sharing issues addressed? | Were sustainability issues addressed? |
|---------|---|---------------------------------------|--|--|
| | | | | <p>most crucial. Adding to this problem, there have been 5 changes in the Director General's post at the DNPWC between 1996-1999 and there have three Chief Wardens in the same time period. This made it extremely difficult to plan effectively for post-project sustainability.</p> <p>The consultant who conducted the final evaluation of this project suggested a follow-on project that would specifically focus on ensuring that the very promising activities initiated under component two would become sustainable within the HMG context.</p> <p>For component three, the activities were deemed as not being sustainable in a self-supporting way in the absence of project funding. DNPWC was hoping to sustain its Research and Training Centre</p> |

| Sn o | Project name, country and implementing agency | Was there stake holder participation? | Were benefit sharing issues addressed? | Were sustainability issues addressed? |
|---------|---|--|---|---|
| | | | | for Protected Areas (RTCPA) at Royal Bardia National Park through user fees, however, no analysis was available during the final evaluation that showed whether this could be a feasible alternative. |
| 12 | Danube Delta Biodiversity, Romania, World Bank | <p>Yes. DDBRA worked with local user groups to gain consensus in management of key areas within the delta. The reviewer believes this was achieved with some success as project funds were redirected to cover local community needs (e.g., reforestation for fuel wood). Full support of local communities seems to be still lacking. As the DPA tries to control access to resources, local villager presented some opposition.</p> <p>The government has been supportive of policy and regulatory reforms (e.g., fishing permits), is willing to cover recurrent costs financing and in</p> | Difficult to glean from the documents reviewed. | <p>The government of Romania is committed to supporting follow-up activities to address sustainability issues as follows:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> with regular budgetary resources to DDBRA, decentralization of management functions and institutional capacity; revision and strengthening of legal framework for conservation management of the DDBRA; by exploring provision for revenue generation from economic activities taking place in the Delta; |

| Sn o | Project name, country and implementing agency | Was there stake holder participation? | Were benefit sharing issues addressed? | Were sustainability issues addressed? |
|---------|--|---|---|--|
| | | <p>carrying out necessary management objectives.</p> <p>The scientific establishment national and internationally (including international NGOs) have been cooperating in defining and establishing key baseline information and indicators for monitoring and posterior assessment.</p> <p>Also, Public education activities conducted, regular information through newspaper, brochures, calendars and televised news reports. Kiosks located in locations frequently visited by fishermen, ecological environmental education program for school started, two park visitor centers established and furnished. Cooperation with established conservation NGOs such as WWF. A small grants program (SGP) was established and funded under the project. Activities financed under the program seem to include typical</p> | | <p>by ratifying international conventions and agreements focused on conservation of the lower Danube region.</p> <p>The project developed the institutional capacity to assess the technical, economic, and environmental sustainability of proposed conservation and development initiatives. This could provide key institutions with revenues generated by providing technical assistance to other countries in the region.</p> <p>Social sustainability has also been explored with activities such as the replacement of state owned fishing enterprises with community-based fishery resource management organizations and provision of legal access to free market prices for fish. Ecotourism may also play a role.</p> <p>There are other GEF projects (e.g., IW pollution control project in the Black Sea</p> |

| Sn o | Project name, country and implementing agency | Was there stake holder participation? | Were benefit sharing issues addressed? | Were sustainability issues addressed? |
|---------|--|---|--|---|
| | | development activities that communities often seek. | | <p>and Danube, the Biodiversity Conservation Management Project) which are supporting activities within the Delta and elsewhere, permitting further financial sustainability.</p> <p>Overall, the ICR is optimistic on this mater. The reviewer supports this view but is concerned about long-term ecological sustainability given root causes and the need to focus on delta-wide and river basin wide matters.</p> |
| 13 | Biodiversity Protection, Slovak Republic, World Bank | Stakeholder groups were consulted during the preparation of the various development and conservation plans. Grants were provided to NGO's but the purpose and achievements of these are not recorded. | An important component of the project was a feasibility study of the possibility of using fee payments to regulate visitation. The results of this study are not recorded. | Since the project focused on support for ongoing activities, in particular increasing their pace and quality, after the project activities will presumably continue as they did before the project. |
| 14 | Danube Delta Biodiversity, Ukraine, World Bank | DPA worked with local user groups to gain consensus in management of the Stevosko-Zhebrianski Plavny region. It | Difficult to glean from the documents reviewed. | This is an area where the project seems to be lacking. Although the project supported the establishment of a trust |

| Sn o | Project name, country and implementing agency | Was there stake holder participation? | Were benefit sharing issues addressed? | Were sustainability issues addressed? |
|---------|---|---|--|---|
| | | <p>also established a small grants program to improve support among local villagers on the biosphere reserve mission. I believe this was achieved with mixed success. Full support of local communities seems to be still lacking. As the DPA tries to control access to resources, local villager presented some opposition</p> <p>Public education activities conducted, regular information through newspaper, brochures, calendars and televised news reports. Kiosks located in locations frequently visited by fishermen, ecological environmental education program for school started, park's visitor center established and furnished. Cooperation with established conservation NGOs such as WWF. A small grants program (SGP) was established and funded under the project, supporting the implementation of</p> | | <p>fund to cover recurrent costs and long-term financing needs, its capitalization is uncertain. Current financial resources available (apparently no more than US\$ 3,000 yearly) is not enough to cover the expected amount of resources required (about \$ 0.150 m yearly). Expected sources of income are likely to be generated from revenues from fines, resource user fees, visitors, and donations mostly from the international community. Ecotourism marketing may also be a possibility. Some activities are likely to continue with bilateral support (e.g.. Dutch contribution to WWF Green Danube initiative)</p> |

| Sn o | Project name, country and implementing agency | Was there stake holder participation? | Were benefit sharing issues addressed? | Were sustainability issues addressed? |
|---------|--|---|---|--|
| | | 22 projects. Activities financed under the program seem to include typical development activities that communities often seek. . A Two-day festival was organized at the end of the SGP, which brought additional environmental awareness | | |

ANNEX – 3: Potential Conflicts Between and Among Stakeholder Groups

| Issues | Stakeholders | | | | | | | | | | |
|--|---|---|---|---|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|--|--|--|------------------------------|----------------------------|
| | IIBs- Intended Indirect Beneficiaries | IDBs-Intended Direct Beneficiaries | | | | | UBs- Unintended Beneficiaries | Losers | | | |
| | Donor Donor Country/ Institution's Views = <i>Donr</i> | Governments | | Civil Society | Local Population | | Consultants/ Suppliers/ Con | Intended Direct Losers IDL | Unintended Direct Losers UDL | Unintended Indirect Losers | |
| | | National Nat | Sub-national Sub | | Dominant Domi | Oppressed Opp | | | | National UIL-N | Global UIL-G |
| FOR TCIS IN GENERAL | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Setting the broad Goals/ Objectives | PMC³⁶: None (W ³⁷):H ³⁸ Internal Conflicts (IC ³⁹): L ⁴⁰ | PMC: None W: H IC: L | PMC: None W: H IC: L | PMC: None W: H IC: L | | | | | | | |

³⁶ PMC=Potential Major Conflicts: Refers to potential major conflicts among stakeholders (referred to by their codes) among whom there is a potential for conflict

³⁷ W=Weight: Refers to the weight to be ascribed to the views of the stakeholder for the issue being addressed

³⁸ H=High

³⁹ IC=Levels of internal conflicts on an issue within the stakeholders

| Issues | Stakeholders | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|--|--|---|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|--|--|--|---------------------------------------|----------------------------|
| | IIBs- Intended Indirect Beneficiaries | IDBs-Intended Direct Beneficiaries | | | | | UBs- Unintended Beneficiaries | Losers | | | |
| | Donor Donor Country/ Institution's Views = <i>Donr</i> | Governments | | Civil Society | Local Population | | Consultants/ Suppliers/ Con | Intended Direct Losers IDL | Unintended Direct Losers UDL | Unintended Indirect Losers | |
| | | National Nat | Sub-national Sub | | Dominant Domi | Oppressed Opp | | | | National UIL-N | Global UIL-G |
| NATIONAL LEVEL TCIS | | | | | | | | | | | |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Prioritizing among objectives | PMC: Nat/Civ/UIL-G W: M ⁴¹ IC: M | PMC: Donr/ Sub/Civ / UIL-N W: H IC: M | PMC: Nat/Civ W: M IC: L | PMC: Nat/ Sub/ Donr W: H IC: H | | | | | PMC: Nat W: H IC: M | PMC: Donr W: H IC: M | |

⁴⁰ L=Low

⁴¹ M=Medium

| Issues | Stakeholders | | | | | | | | | | |
|--|--|---|--|--|---|---|-----------------------------------|------------------------|--|--|-----------------------------------|
| | IIBs- Intended Indirect Beneficiaries | IDBs-Intended Direct Beneficiaries | | | | | UBs- Unintended Beneficiaries | Losers | | | |
| | Donor | Governments | | Civil Society | Local Population | | Consultants/ Suppliers/ | Intended Direct Losers | Unintended Direct Losers | Unintended Indirect Losers | |
| | Donor Country/ Institution's Views = <i>Donr</i> | National | Sub-national | | Dominant | Oppressed | Con | IDL | UDL | National | Global |
| | Nat | Sub | Civ | Domi | Opp | UIL-N | | | | UIL-G | |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Deciding coverage | PMC: Nat/Civ/UDL/UIL-N/ UL-G W: L IC: L | PMC: Donr/ Sub/Civ / Domi/ Opp/ UIL-N W: H IC: M | PMC: Nat/Civ/ Domi/ Opp/ UIL-N W: H IC: L | PMC: Donr/ Nat/ Sub/ W: H IC: H | PMC: Nat/ Sub/ Opp W:M IC: L | PMC: Nat/ Sub/ Domi W: H IC: M | | | PMC: Donr/Nat/ Sub W: H IC: L | PMC: Donr/Nat/ Sub W: H IC: L | PMC: Donr W: H IC: M |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Selecting strategies | PMC: Nat/Civ/UDL/ Con W: L to M ⁴² IC: M | PMC: Donr/ Sub/Civ / UIL-N W: H IC: M | PMC: Nat/Civ/ UIL-N W: H IC: L | PMC: Donr/ Nat/ Sub W: H IC: H | | | PMC: Donr W: L IC: L | | PMC: Donr/Nat/ Sub W: H IC: L | | |

⁴² Generally low. However, where issues of sustainability, equity, probity etc. are concerned, medium.

| Issues | Stakeholders | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|--|------------------------------------|--|---------------|---|---|--|--|--|---|----------------------------|--|
| | IIBs- Intended Indirect Beneficiaries | IDBs-Intended Direct Beneficiaries | | | | | UBs- Unintended Beneficiaries | Losers | | | | |
| | Donor Donor Country/ Institution's Views = <i>Donr</i> | Governments | | Civil Society | Local Population | | Consultants/ Suppliers/ Con | Intended Direct Losers IDL | Unintended Direct Losers UDL | Unintended Indirect Losers | | |
| | | National Nat | Sub-national Sub | | Dominant Domi | Oppressed Opp | | | | National UIL-N | Global UIL-G | |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Determining Implementation Modalities | PMC: Nat/Civ/Con/ UDL W: L to H ⁴³ IC: M | | PMC: Donr/ Civ/ Domi/ Opp/IDL /UDL W: H IC: M | | PMC: Donr/ Nat/ IDL W: H IC: H | PMC: Nat/ Opp W: M IC: L | PMC: Nat/ Domi W: H IC: M | PMC: Donr W: L IC: L | PMC: Nat/Civ W: M IC: L | PMC: Donr/Nat W: H IC: L | | |

⁴³ Generally low. However, where issues of transparency, participation, decentralization and internal national accountability are concerned, high.

| Issues | Stakeholders | | | | | | | | | | |
|--|---|---|---|---|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|--|--|---|---|---|
| | IIBs- Intended Indirect Beneficiaries | IDBs-Intended Direct Beneficiaries | | | | | UBs- Unintended Beneficiaries | Losers | | | |
| | Donor Donor Country/ Institution's Views = <i>Donr</i> | Governments | | Civil Society | Local Population | | Consultants/ Suppliers/ Con | Intended Direct Losers IDL | Unintended Direct Losers UDL | Unintended Indirect Losers | |
| | | National Nat | Sub-national Sub | | Dominant Domi | Oppressed Opp | | | | National UIL-N | Global UIL-G |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Assessing viability & optimality | PMC: <i>Nat/Civ/Con/UDL/UIL-N/UIL-G</i> W: M IC: M | PMC: <i>Donr/Civ/UDL/UIL-N</i> W: H IC: M | | PMC: <i>Donr/Nat</i> W: H IC: H | | | PMC: <i>Donr</i> W: L IC: L | | PMC: <i>Donr/Nat</i> W: H IC: L | PMC: <i>Donr/Nat</i> W: H IC: L | PMC: <i>Donr</i> W: H IC: M |
| SUB-NATIONAL TCIS | | | | | | | | | | | |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Prioritizing among objectives | PMC: <i>Nat/Sub/Civ/UIL-G</i> W: M IC: L | PMC: <i>Donr/Sub/Civ</i> W: M IC: L | PMC: <i>Donr/Nat/Civ/UIL-N</i> W: H IC: L | PMC: <i>Donr/Nat/Sub</i> W: H IC: H | | | | | | PMC: <i>Sub</i> W: H IC: M | PMC: <i>Donr</i> W: H IC: M |

| Issues | Stakeholders | | | | | | | | | | |
|--|--|---|--|---|--|---|-----------------------------------|------------------------|--|--|-----------------------------------|
| | IIBs- Intended Indirect Beneficiaries | IDBs-Intended Direct Beneficiaries | | | | | UBs- Unintended Beneficiaries | Losers | | | |
| | Donor | Governments | | Civil Society | Local Population | | Consultants/ Suppliers/ | Intended Direct Losers | Unintended Direct Losers | Unintended Indirect Losers | |
| | Donor Country/ Institution's Views = <i>Donr</i> | National | Sub-national | | Dominant | Oppressed | Con | IDL | UDL | National | Global |
| | Nat | Sub | Civ | Domi | Opp | UIL-N | | | | UIL-G | |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Deciding coverage | PMC: Nat/Civ/UDL/UIL-N/ UL-G W: L IC: L | PMC: Donr/ Sub/Civ / Domi/ Opp/ UIL-N W: M IC: M | PMC: Nat/Civ/ Domi/ Opp/ UIL-N W: H IC: L | PMC: Donr/ Nat/ Sub W: H IC: H | PMC: Nat/ Sub/ Opp W: M IC: L | PMC: Nat/ Sub/ Domi W: H IC: M | | | PMC: Donr/Nat/ Sub W: H IC: L | PMC: Donr/Nat/ Sub W: H IC: L | PMC: Donr W: H IC: M |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Selecting strategies | PMC: Nat/Civ/UDL/ Con W: L to M ⁴⁴ IC: M | PMC: Donr/ Sub/Civ / UIL-N W: M IC: M | PMC: Nat/Civ/ UIL-N W: H IC: L | PMC: Donr/ Nat/ Sub W: H IC: H | | | PMC: Donr W: L IC: L | | PMC: Donr/Nat/ Sub W: H IC: L | | |

⁴⁴ Generally low. However, where issues of sustainability, equity, probity etc. are concerned, medium.

| Issues | Stakeholders | | | | | | | | | | |
|--|--|---|---|---|--|---|--|--|--|---|---|
| | IIBs- Intended Indirect Beneficiaries | IDBs-Intended Direct Beneficiaries | | | | | UBs- Unintended Beneficiaries | Losers | | | |
| | Donor Donor Country/ Institution's Views = <i>Donr</i> | Governments | | Civil Society | Local Population | | Consultants/ Suppliers/ Con | Intended Direct Losers IDL | Unintended Direct Losers UDL | Unintended Indirect Losers | |
| | | National Nat | Sub-national Sub | | Dominant Domi | Oppressed Opp | | | | National UIL-N | Global UIL-G |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Assessing viability & optimality | PMC: <i>Nat/Civ/Con/UDL/UIL-N/UIL-G</i> W: M IC: M | PMC: <i>Donr/Civ/UDL/UIL-N</i> W: M IC: M | PMC: <i>Donr/Nat/Civ/UDL/UIL-N</i> W: H IC: M | PMC: <i>Donr/Nat/Sub</i> W: H IC: H | | | PMC: <i>Donr</i> W: L IC: L | | PMC: <i>Donr/Nat/Sub</i> W: H IC: L | PMC: <i>Donr/Nat/Sub</i> W: H IC: L | PMC: <i>Donr</i> W: H IC: M |
| Local/Location Specific TCIs | | | | | | | | | | | |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Prioritizing among objectives | PMC: <i>Nat/Sub/Civ/UDL</i> W: M IC: L | PMC: <i>Donr/Sub/Civ/Donr/ Sub/Civ/ Domi/ Opp/ UDL</i> W: M IC: L | PMC: <i>Donr/Nat/Civ/ Domi/ Opp/ UDL</i> W: M IC: L | PMC: <i>Donr/Nat/Sub</i> W: M IC: H | PMC: <i>Donr/Nat/Sub/ Opp</i> W: M IC: L | PMC: <i>Donr/Nat/Sub/ Domi</i> W: H IC: M | | | PMC: <i>Donr/Nat/ Sub</i> W: H IC: L | | |

| Issues | Stakeholders | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|--|---|--|---|---|---|-------------------------------|------------------------|---|---|-----------------|
| | IIBs- Intended Indirect Beneficiaries | IDBs-Intended Direct Beneficiaries | | | | | UBs- Unintended Beneficiaries | Losers | | | |
| | Donor | Governments | | Civil Society | Local Population | | Consultants/ Suppliers/ | Intended Direct Losers | Unintended Direct Losers | Unintended Indirect Losers | |
| | Donor Country/ Institution's Views = <i>Donr</i> | National Nat | Sub-national Sub | Civ | Dominant Domi | Oppressed Opp | Con | IDL | UDL | National UIL-N | Global UIL-G |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Deciding location/ coverage | PMC: <i>Nat/Civ/UIL-N</i> W: L IC: L | PMC: <i>Donr/ Sub/Civ / Domi/ Opp/ UIL-N</i> W: M IC: L | PMC: <i>Nat/Civ/ Domi/ Nat/ Sub</i> W: H IC: H | PMC: <i>Donr/ Nat/ Sub</i> W: H IC: H | PMC: <i>Nat/ Sub/ Opp</i> W:M IC: L | PMC: <i>Nat/ Sub/ Domi</i> W: H IC: M | | | PMC: <i>Donr/ Nat/ Sub</i> W: M IC: L | PMC: <i>Donr/Nat/Sub</i> W: H IC: L | |

| Issues | Stakeholders | | | | | | | | | | |
|--|--|--|---|---|--|---|--|--|---|------------------------------|----------------------------|
| | IIBs- Intended Indirect Beneficiaries | IDBs-Intended Direct Beneficiaries | | | | | UBs- Unintended Beneficiaries | Losers | | | |
| | Donor Donor Country/ Institution's Views = <i>Donr</i> | Governments | | Civil Society | Local Population | | Consultants/ Suppliers/ Con | Intended Direct Losers IDL | Unintended Direct Losers UDL | Unintended Indirect Losers | |
| | | National Nat | Sub-national Sub | | Dominant Domi | Oppressed Opp | | | | National UIL-N | Global UIL-G |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Selecting strategies | PMC: Nat/Civ/UDL/ Con W: L to M ⁴⁶ IC: M | PMC: Donr/ Sub/Civ / UDL W: L IC: M | PMC: Nat/Civ/ UDL W: M IC: L | PMC: Donr/ Nat/ Sub W: H IC: H | PMC: Donr/ Nat/ Sub/ Opp W: M IC: L | PMC: Donr/ Nat/ Sub/ Domi W: H IC: M | PMC: Donr W: L IC: L | | PMC: Donr/ Nat/ Sub W: M IC: H | | |

⁴⁶ Generally low. However, where issues of sustainability, equity, probity etc. are concerned, medium.

| Issues | Stakeholders | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|--|--|---|--|---|--|--|---|------------------------------|----------------------------|
| | IIBs- Intended Indirect Beneficiaries | IDBs-Intended Direct Beneficiaries | | | | | UBs- Unintended Beneficiaries | Losers | | | |
| | Donor Donor Country/ Institution's Views = <i>Donr</i> | Governments | | Civil Society | Local Population | | Consultants/ Suppliers/ Con | Intended Direct Losers IDL | Unintended Direct Losers UDL | Unintended Indirect Losers | |
| | | National Nat | Sub-national Sub | | Dominant Domi | Oppressed Opp | | | | National UIL-N | Global UIL-G |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Determining Implementation Modalities | PMC: <i>Nat/Civ/Con/UDL</i> W: L to H ⁴⁷ IC: M | PMC: <i>Donr/Civ/Domi/Opp/IDL/UDL</i> W: L IC: M | PMC: <i>Donr/Nat/Civ/Domi/Opp/IDL/UDL</i> W: M IC: L | PMC: <i>Donr/Nat/Sub/IDL</i> W: H IC: H | PMC: <i>Nat/Sub/Opp</i> W: M IC: L | PMC: <i>Nat/Sub/Domi</i> W: H IC: M | PMC: Donr W: L IC: L | PMC: <i>Nat/Sub/Civ</i> W: M IC: L | PMC: <i>Donr/Nat/Sub</i> W: H IC: L | | |

⁴⁷ Generally low. However, where issues of transparency, participation, decentralization and internal national accountability are concerned, high.

| Issues | Stakeholders | | | | | | | | | | |
|--|---|---|---|---|---|---|--|---|--|-----------------------------------|------------------------|
| | IIBs- Intended Indirect Beneficiaries | IDBs-Intended Direct Beneficiaries | | | | | UBs- Unintended Beneficiaries | Losers | | | |
| | Donor Donor Country/ Institution's Views = <i>Donr</i> | Governments | | Civil Society | Local Population | | Consultants/ Suppliers/ Con | Intended Direct Losers IDL | Unintended Direct Losers UDL | Unintended Indirect Losers | |
| | | National Nat | Sub-national Sub | | Dominant Domi | Oppressed Opp | | | | National UIL-N | Global UIL-G |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Assessing viability & optimality | PMC: Nat/Civ/Con/UDL/UIL-N/UIL-G W: M IC: M | PMC: Donr/Civ/UDL/UIL-N W: M IC: M | PMC: Donr/Nat/Civ/UDL/UIL-N W: M IC: M | PMC: Donr/Nat/Sub W: H IC: H | PMC: Donr/Nat/Sub W: M IC: L | PMC: Donr/Nat/Sub W: H IC: M | PMC: Donr W: L IC: L | PMC: Donr/Nat/Sub W: H IC: L | PMC: Donr/Nat/Sub W: H IC: L | PMC: Donr W: H IC: M | |

Annex - 4: Funding Levels

| <i>Country</i> | <i>Aid as percent of GNP</i> | <i>Aid as percent of Central Gov't Expenditure</i> | <i>Aid as percent of Gross Dom. Investment</i> | <i>Aid as percent of Imports</i> |
|----------------------|------------------------------|--|--|----------------------------------|
| <i>Benin</i> | 11 | - | 57 | 31 |
| <i>Burkina Faso</i> | 16 | - | 61 | 50 |
| <i>Burundi</i> | 13 | 52 | 183 | 76 |
| <i>Cambodia</i> | 12 | - | 76 | 29 |
| <i>Chad</i> | 14 | - | 72 | 37 |
| <i>Congo, Rep.</i> | 15 | - | 45 | 13 |
| <i>Eritrea</i> | 15 | - | 46 | 21 |
| <i>Ethiopia</i> | 10 | - | 52 | 36 |
| <i>Gambia, The</i> | 10 | - | 57 | 14 |
| <i>Guinea</i> | 10 | - | 45 | 40 |
| <i>Guinea-Bissau</i> | 50 | - | 198 | 104 |
| <i>Haiti</i> | 12 | - | 116 | 40 |
| <i>Kyrgyz Rep.</i> | 14 | - | 63 | 27 |
| <i>Loa PDR</i> | 20 | - | 68 | 46 |
| <i>Madagascar</i> | 24 | - | 201 | 71 |
| <i>Malawi</i> | 14 | - | 113 | 28 |
| <i>Mauritania</i> | 24 | - | 130 | 57 |
| <i>Mongolia</i> | 26 | - | 131 | 45 |
| <i>Mozambique</i> | 37 | - | 119 | 82 |
| <i>Nicaragua</i> | 23 | - | - | 23 |
| <i>Niger</i> | 19 | - | 170 | 73 |

| | | | | |
|---------------------|----|----|------|-----|
| <i>Rwanda</i> | 32 | - | 294 | 116 |
| <i>Sierra Leone</i> | 16 | 89 | -311 | 87 |
| <i>Tanzania</i> | 13 | - | 68 | 45 |
| <i>Uganda</i> | 13 | - | 84 | 19 |
| <i>Zambia</i> | 17 | - | 107 | 35 |

Source: Brautigam 2000

ANNEX - 5: Factors Inhibiting Ownership

What does “ownership” actually mean? In theory, it should apply to the ability of governments to implement their own development visions, whether or not these coincide with those currently popular in the development industry. In practice, the term is currently used to denote the extent to which there is a coincidence of interest and ideas between aid agencies and the political leadership regarding the design and implementation of certain programs and policies favored by the aid agencies. For difficult economic reforms that involve risks to the political survival of the leadership, or for low priority projects without much political pay off, the interests of these two key sets of actors will rarely coincide, and so “ownership” (by political leaders) is likely to remain limited.

The way in which the international aid system operates tends to reinforce the lack of ownership by aid dependent countries. When local institutions are weak, donors tend to take over. For example, in Mali, the study on aid coordination referred to above noted that “public agencies with a relevant role or responsibility do not provide overall co-ordination,” and that “donors do their best to play this role in lieu of the state. Likewise, when the World Bank began to encourage member countries to produce National Environmental Action Plans (NEAPs) in 1987, many low-income countries were slow to take advantage of the assistance offered by the Bank. Frustrated with the slowness, and eager to show progress in environmental matters to forestall its critics, the Bank then “compelled IDA governmental matters to forestall its by June 1993”, a decision that effectively led to the hurried preparation of NEAPs by NGOs and outside consultants, with little government ownership [Dorm-Adzobu 1995: 29].

A recommendation in a 1994 report on capacity building emphasized that the World Bank should “move toward empowering our clients to take the leadership and share ownership of operations” [World Bank 1994; emphasis added]. Yet the very language of this statement side-steps the fact that power and ownership shifted to the World Bank and other

donors in the first place in part because there was not a coincidence of interests between the donors and governments, particularly with regard to conditionality-based lending. With almost two decades during which conditionality has been a dominant practice in aid dependent countries, the practice whereby donors make demands and countries react has become institutionalized. The language of “sharing ownership”, and “empowering clients” highlights just where the ownership and power currently lie: with the donors.

While clearly reflecting a high degree of concern, this language and approach bypass several basic problems that will confront those committed to change. Donors and governments frequently do have different interests and this is in part why donors took the initiatives that gave them ownership in the first place. In addition, the incentives that have been established and which, over time, have become entrenched in the aid system mean that there is a conflict between the donors’ interest in moving money through “operations” whether or not they are “owned” by governments, and the recommendation that clients be “empowered”, in which case they will likely say “no” to many things the donors want them to do, as officials in Mauritius have done.

Given the current aid system, and the many years in which planning officials in aid dependent countries have grown used not only to not saying “no” to proposed projects, but often to not even being asked, it will be difficult to change this situation, given the incentives that presently structure aid relationships. Indeed, a 1996 review of capacity building efforts at the World Bank pointed out that despite official recognition of the problems inherent in lack of ownership, recently revised guidelines for project development contained no directive “for making sure that borrower nationals are involved and committed at every stage of the project process” [Mule, 1996: 17]

Source: Brautigam 2000

ANNEX - 6: Key Contradictions

- Donor agencies recognize that ownership is necessary to make aid sustainable and build local capacity; in practice however, they cheerfully overload partner countries with top-down development targets, conditionalities and centralized management processes, all of which tend to work against local self-reliance and ownership;
- Pressures on donor agencies to achieve ‘quick and visible results’ forces them to accelerate the natural pace of development processes, based on the injection of big money and standard technical approaches;
- Drives to disburse funds by deadlines, and to spend within fixed periods, weakens participation and local self-reliance; front workers are often disempowered by targets and orders from above, that make it difficult to respond to specific local dynamics
- An army of people are mobilized to account for aid resources and their utilization, but at the end of the day no one really knows what results have been achieved, nor their sustainability;
- The new development agenda puts a premium on dialogue, negotiation, non-linear cause-effect attributions and above all, on risk-taking; yet the overall incentive culture within donor agencies is geared to risk aversion and bureaucratic accountability.

Source: Bossuyt 2001

ANNEX - 7: Capacity Development

What is Meant by the Term “Capacity Building”?

The term “capacity building” has been used in many contexts and fora, but for a long time little analysis has actually taken place regarding its meaning. In xxxx UNDP called together experts from many countries to shed some light on the concept. The group concluded that capacity building may be defined as the actions needed to create or enhance the capability of a country, an institution, or an individual to determine and carry out its allotted functions and achieve its objectives. Most commonly, it is understood to encompass improvements in human resources (such as education, training and management), institutions and organizations. These include improvements in physical assets and procedures, as well as in the environment in which people and organizations function (laws and regulations). Capacity is therefore not the mere existence of potential but rather how existing potential is harnessed and utilized to identify and solve problems in order to be considered as capacity.

Capacity development can take place at three levels: the *individual*, *institutional*, and the *systemic*. At the *individual* level, capacity building refers to the process of changing attitudes and behaviors—imparting knowledge and developing skills while maximizing the benefits of participation, knowledge exchange and ownership. At the *institutional* level it focuses on the overall organizational performance and functioning capabilities, as well as the ability of an organization to adapt to change. It aims to develop the institution as a total system, including individuals, groups and the organization itself. At the *systemic* level, it is concerned with the overall policy framework in which individuals and organizations operate and interact with the external environment, as well as the formal and informal

relationships of institutions.⁴⁸ Interactions between the three levels are also important.

Capacity is relevant in both the short-term (for example, the ability to address an immediate problem) and the long-term (the ability to create an environment in which particular changes will take place). Capacity may imply “action,” or “inaction,” depending on the result desired. Capacity constraints can occur at local, national, or global levels and amongst any individual or group of stakeholders.

Based on CDI, October 2000, *Country Capacity Development Needs and Priorities: A Synthesis*.

1. “...capacity is the combination of people, institutions and practices that permits countries to reach their development goals... Capacity building is... investment inhuman capital, in human capital, institutions and practices” (World Bank, 1996)
2. Capacity building is “...any system, effort or process... which includes among it's major objectives strengthening the capability of elected chief executive officers, chief administrative officers, department and agency heads and programme managers in general purpose government to plan, implement, manage or evaluate policies, strategies or programs designed to impact on social conditions in the community.” (Cohen, 1993)
3. “Capacity building is the ability of individuals, groups, institutions and organizations to identify and solve development problems over time.” (Peter Morgan, 1996)
4. “Capacity... the ability to perform appropriate tasks effectively, efficiently, and sustain ably.’ (UNDP, 1996)
5. “Capacity building is any support that strengthens an institution’s ability to effectively and efficiently design, implement and evaluate development activities according to its mission.” (UNICEF Namibia, 1996)

⁴⁸ UNDP, October, 1999, *Capacity Building for Environmental Management: A Best Practices Guide*.

6. "Capacity building is a process by which individuals, groups, institutions, organizations and societies enhance their abilities to identify and meet development challenges in a sustainable manner." (CIDA, 1996)
7. "Capacity building... the ability of individuals, groups, institutions and organizations to identify and solve development problems over time." (UNDP, 1996)
8. "[Capacity can be understood as the]... behavior and functioning of work communities... people... linked together... within organizations, across organizations or part of actual living communities". (Morgan, 1997)
9. "the acquisition of ability by an institution, organization, group or individual to perform a function or group of functions". (UNDP, 1999)
10. "...capacities are ultimately defined in terms of the goal of CB, i.e. development in broad terms, and more specific visions or facets of that development vision according to the orientations of those involved. For UNICEF, capacities would be understood in terms of the goal of achieving child rights." (UNICEF, 1999b)

Source: UNDP/UNICEF 1999

What is capacity?

- Capacity is the ability to define and realize goals, where defining goals entails identifying and understanding problems⁴⁹, analyzing the situation, and formulating possible strategies and actions for response.
- More specifically capacity derives from:
 - establishing effective processes (functions, roles, responsibilities, tasks) for identifying problems or issues, and formulating and realizing goals;

⁴⁹ The word "concern" should be used rather than "problem". A problem is something to be solved. Our aim is to respond effectively to factors affecting or relating to the condition of people – which are not necessarily the same things as problems. For purposes of simplicity, however, the text will refer to the more commonly understood term "problem".

- carried out by appropriate *actors* (individual and collective); organized in effective *structures* for accountability, management and collective voice;
- who have the *motivation, knowledge, skills, and resources* to perform effectively; and are supported in doing so by “*rules*” or *norms*⁵⁰ (formal and informal, economic, social, political) that exist within organizations (public, private, civil society), in looser social groups and across society.
- The above view pushes us to think of “*systems*” for defining and achieving goals. This means that we not only need to look at actors at different levels and across sectors but also, crucially, the network of relationships or connections between them. Such a viewpoint makes us aware that weaknesses in capacity at any level or with any key actor, whether at community level or nationally or somewhere in-between these levels, will affect the capacity of the whole system to deal with a problem in order to achieve a goal. This conceptualization of capacity, therefore, underlines the importance of identifying and understanding the system relevant to achieving a goal as a basis for determining who needs to do what in order to achieve that particular goal.
- Capacity as described thus far is neutral in terms of the nature of the goals pursued. However, the reference to “*appropriate actors*” does indicate that a *value-based choice* must be made in terms of whose involvement is appropriate in what roles. The choice may be dictated by considerations of effectiveness, such as who has the necessary knowledge and skills, or who has leadership and energy. For UN agencies it is clear that the choice of who is involved must also reflect concern for “*voice*”, the need for meaningful participation and the inclusion of marginalized groups.

⁵⁰ The ‘rules’ here are often referred to as ‘institutions’ not in the sense of government entities, but rather the formal and informal norms which guide interactions in the social, political and economic spheres (North, 1994). This includes formal norms – legislation, policy, political parties or processes and administrative structures and mechanisms. Institutions also include informal norms – customs, traditions and practice shaping socio-economic class structures, age and gender roles, structures of entitlements (kinship, clientelism, etc.), patterns of civil society organization, mechanisms of participation and the social norms and values which support them.

- In bringing the “appropriate actors” together, their *interests* and broader societal *norms* are critical factors to consider. Interest and norms shape how different actors in society - individuals, groups and organizations - interact with one another and determine who is linked in formal and informal networks and in what roles.
- *Resources* in this equation are of course also important. Access to and control over financial, material, technological, information and human resources are vital issues and, in their absence, potentially constraining.
- In addition, capacity must be understood in terms of a specific *cultural, social and political context*.
- Capacity must be understood as something which exists in degrees at all levels of society - community/national, individual, household, institutional, system. Capacity *does exist without outside intervention*, though it may be very much constrained. This implies that one must first understand capacities or elements of capacity that exist before engaging in any effort to build on or strengthen them. (This also suggests care in using the terminology of ‘capacity gaps’ which may be interpreted as downplaying existing capacity.)

What is Capacity Development (CD)?

- CD is about creating conditions that support the appropriate actors to take up the appropriate roles in this process of identifying problems, and defining and realizing goals.
- In relation to a given ‘problem’, issue or goal, CD thus starts by asking the question ‘who should be doing what?’
- CD can include interventions with regard to any of the ‘requirements’ or contributing factors to capacity; this might include interventions to bring about change in skills, resources and values as well as interventions which try to influence which actors are involved in what roles within a system.
- It is about releasing constraints on capacity or enhancing what already exists.

- *It is not just a technical exercise but a socio-political exercise.*
- *It requires understanding of power relations (the political dimension) and often implies a shift in power balance. CD is not neutral.*
- *For UN organizations, CD must involve ensuring that the “appropriate actors” are involved in the right roles and should be directed towards strengthening broad-based participatory processes and institutional development. In this way, CD contributes to the realization of human rights as well as good governance.*
- *As all of the above suggests, CD is a long-term process. Shifts in power sharing, development of participatory processes - none of these come about quickly or easily. Defined interventions such as advocacy, social mobilization, training, or ‘process consultation’ fit into a longer-term CD strategy or programme. CD requires careful consideration of the scope and timing of interventions in support of broad national capacity.*
- *CD aims to reduce dependency and inequity, to increase self-reliance, to render national (including central and local) groups autonomous in their capacities. Similarly, CD is about achieving sustainable people-centered development results. This does not entail sustainability of any one organization or entity, but a responsiveness to emerging issues in a broad-based networks of actors.*

Many questions around capacity and CD are highlighted in the following sections on planning and monitoring of CD. However, the workshop process served to identify a few key questions which require resolution or further examination:

- *CD for whom? This question goes much further than the question “whose capacity is to be strengthened?” asking more broadly who should benefit. This reflects the concern that, in engaging in CD to strengthen ‘national capacities’, our chosen strategy may lead us to select entry points, for example, at the central government level. Yet in doing this,*

it is possible to lose focus on people-centered results and who benefits from CD. Discussions highlighted the risk that CD efforts may fall short, strengthening capacity without attention to how that capacity is used and for whose benefit. The question is thus how to keep people, particularly more marginalized groups, in the picture and part of the process. The concept of “community capacity building” (CCB), also discussed at the workshop, is a response to this concern. CCB is in fact entirely consistent with the conceptualization of capacity as outlined above. The slight but significant difference in CCB is that it explicitly places community level capacities at the heart of the broader analysis, thus situating interventions at other levels of society in terms of how they influence the community level.

- *CD for what goal? Very related to the above is the question about the ultimate goal of CD - be it capacity in and of itself, human development, governance and/or human rights. The question reflects the concern that the goal should not be simply to achieve fulfillment of some specific human rights or development objectives, but to foster processes, structures, norms and values which sustain the promotion and protection of rights and development processes, i.e. national capacity. The appropriate formulation around the relations between governance, human rights and human development were not resolved.*

Finally, a few questions of a much more operational nature were identified, highlighting areas for further research and learning on capacity:

- *How do people organize themselves to acquire capacity? What societal arrangements support (or hinder) CD and how?*
- *How replicable are different experiences? What are the contextual dimensions to successful CD approaches?*

How can performance management or results-based management approaches be made to foster CD?

Source: UNDP/UNICEF 1999a

ANNEX - 8: The Biodiversity Conservation Prioritization Project (BCPP) Method

The BCPP approach resulted from a review of methodologies being used in similar or related biodiversity prioritization efforts, both nationally and internationally. It contrasts with approaches where, when a country decides to prepare a biodiversity strategy, a team of expatriate expert biologists is brought in to analyze information. Most of the work of these experts will be done at their desks or derived from a single experts workshop, and is likely to result in a series of reports and data sets made available at the national level. Although they usually answer the question of 'what' and 'where' to conserve, they rarely address the question of 'how' strategies for conservation will be designed and implemented.

An extra step is often needed to build local expertise and commitment and to translate the strategies and recommendations into actions on the ground. Additionally, most prioritization processes focus narrowly on selecting geographically disconnected areas rather than on the wealth of diversity that is part of a living landscape, including the medicinal plants or wild relatives of cultivated plants occurring in human-impacted habitats.

Designing the BCPP Approach

Following the review of other approaches, the BCPP project designed a participatory methodology based on a number of key principles from other experiences. These principles are

- Leverage voluntary participation to enable the contributions of individuals and local groups to have a real impact.*
- Engage participants in ways that tap their ongoing interests to build on existing momentum and to ensure that the strategy will fit into ongoing work.*
- Strengthen the capacity of those involved to build a strong and informed network of experts and non-experts committed to the process.*

- *Gather and organize large quantities of crucial but unpublished data to provide a solid foundation for priority setting, based on the work and experience of scientists, professionals, activists, local individuals, and communities.*
- *Provide for the exchange of information among various levels and sectors to allow local feedback to influence national policies.*
- *Integrate biological and socio-economic concerns to ensure that priorities are scientifically rigorous, socially just and workable.*
- *Involve and motivate local people in the implementation of realistic, achievable conservation plans.*

The BCPP Approach

Step 1: Form a steering group that represents all stakeholders.

Goals for This step:

- *To create a vision for the priority-setting project.*
- *To design the project toward the vision.*
- *To develop a mechanism to direct and manage the process.*

Enabling conditions:

- *Credible, respected individuals are involved so the project's recommendations are more likely to be widely accepted and other funding and energy can be leveraged for the benefit of the project.*
- *Individual perspectives of various groups - ranging from ecologists and wildlife managers, to economists and sociologists, to local community members - are included so priorities and strategies are more likely to be accepted and implemented.*
- *Agencies and individuals representing local and national stakeholders from around the country have a voice so the priorities and strategies address the mix of levels and scales.*

- *Individuals are excited about the potential for synergy between the priority-setting work and their own ongoing projects and they maintain their commitment and involvement.*

Process & Activities:

- *Select members based on requirements above.*
- *Define roles and responsibilities of the steering group as a whole and for individual members.*
- *Provide funding to selected organizations and individuals to carry out project activities.*

Step 2: Design a process for managing in an open and participatory manner.

Goals for This Step:

- *To develop processes that ensure participation and consultation.*
- *To establish an effective system for sharing and managing information.*

Enabling Conditions:

- *Open discussion and the building of consensus among participants are encouraged so ownership of and commitment to the process are well established.*
- *Opportunities are created to build a network of government staff, NGOs, and Scientists committed to working together and encouraging action at a variety of levels so the likelihood of success can be maximized.*

Process & Activities:

- *Plan a series of national workshops to help participants agree on methods, share progress, debate, and coordinate actions.*
- *Conduct the first of these workshops as a national project design workshop to engage all participants in the project and enable them to agree on the prioritization methods and work plan.*

- Plan other workshops as needed, at least one halfway through to make sure that the work is on schedule and another at the end to review and share findings with a wider audience.
- Design workshop activities that provide the opportunity for experts from different parts of the country to work together, enable biologists and social scientists to learn from each others' perspectives, and create momentum and commitment to support a rolling process of prioritization and strategy development and refinement.
- Establish or identify existing information support systems to manage the large volumes of data compiled during the process so the process can continue smoothly and the data are readily accessible to all those involved in biodiversity conservation in the area.
- Fund appropriate organizations to take on these tasks as required.

Steps 3: Establish priorities and strategies at macro and micro levels.

Goals for This Step:

- To identify priority sites for conservation.
- To identify priority species for conservation.
- To develop strategies for local, regional, and national conservation actions.

Enabling Conditions:

- The process is guided by the philosophy that effective priority setting and planning must bring together biological economic/fiscal, social, and cultural concerns so all participants are engaged and committed.
- Ongoing opportunities that were established at the national project design workshop in step 2 allow sub-project teams to participate jointly and independently in both implementing the methodology and integrating all the aspects that must be addressed.

- Biological values are actively integrated with information about social and economic factors in the prioritization process so those biologists who feel strongly that biological values alone should determine the priorities can examine the advantages of considering all aspects.

Process & Activities:

- Design and conduct workshops that provide a chance to emphasize that conservation is as much a social and political process as a biological one, and that prioritization is likely to guide implementation only if all these factors are understood.
- Enable biologists to provide the scientific information upon which successful strategies are founded.
- Engage an active civil society and politicians who will use the information from scientists while balancing their constituents' interests and values in order to move conservation to a more prominent place on the national agenda.

Linking macro and micro:

Prioritizing sites

Sites are prioritized to identify the areas and ecosystems that urgently need enhanced levels of protection and conservation, and to suggest the best ways of conserving them. For conservation to be effective, the process needs to take into account biodiversity value (e.g. use, non-use values) and level of threats. The prioritization should keep in mind the need to conserve the full range of the country's species and ecosystems.

At the design workshop, participants need to decide on a framework for assessing sites i.e., whether this should be at the level of ecosystem, biogeographic zone, or political unit. This choice will depend on the country in question. For each region, ecosystem, or zone, the process is coordinated by a lead organization or team that collects information by bringing together regional and local experts, builds up an initial list of sites, holds expert workshops to fill information gaps, and

gather socio-economic information through consultation with local people, government and non-government organizations. Existing and new data are combined to assign quantitative scores to each site. Where gaps exist in species data, surrogate indicators, such as community types, can be used instead.

The output from the process is a series of reports for each region, ecosystem, or state that list areas ranked according to their relative importance and priority and provide recommendations for local, regional, and national actions needed to conserve the prioritized sites. Priority setting should become an on-going process that regularly identifies sites, fills data gaps, and sets new priorities; it should not be a single event.

Linking macro and micro:

Prioritizing species

Species continue to be the major driving force in conservation. They are the building blocks of biodiversity and appeal to the public and scientists alike.

The national design workshop is the opportunity for experts to develop a framework to systematically assess the conservation status of the country's species. Species can be prioritized in a number of ways: the choice of method depends on the availability of data, time and resources. One useful approach is IUCN Conservation and Management Plan (CAMP) process, which brings together a range of experts in workshops to rapidly assess tax against IUCN threat categories, such as critically endangered, endangered and vulnerable. It allows a vast amount of information both published and unpublished, to be pieced together in a structured manner.

After species information is assessed, research and conservation recommendations are made for every taxon. These include actions at the local, regional, and/or national levels. The recommendations can highlight significant gaps in data coverage, as well as the need to build capacity in national conservation organizations and universities to gather and

provide the data needed of a continuing assessment and monitoring process.

Linking macro and micro:

Developing strategies

A third element of the prioritization process includes assessment of conservation strategies at macro (national) level and developing micro (village, village cluster) level strategies. Studies of macro-strategies are commissioned to focus attention on priority issues relevant to conservation, such as economic incentives, education and awareness, and gender issues, and to identify laws, policies and schemes that can support conservation of the prioritized places and species.

Macro-strategies are a common part of national biodiversity planning. But the micro strategy approach is unique. It aims to:

Identify locally threatened species and sites, and identify threats caused by government policies. This information can feed into the macro-level strategies to promote policies that support local level conservation.

Help communities prepare local strategies for biodiversity conservation. The strength of these strategies lies in their indigenous roots. Action plans are generated from the ground up using local investigators. Local people's knowledge of their constraints and opportunities shapes feasible strategies.

The innovative approach of linking macro- and micro-level information provides new data for integrating conservation into development plans at state and national levels.

Step 4: Hold a national participants workshop to review findings and plan outreach.

Goals for This Step:

- To provide an opportunity for all participants for the various groups to work together to complete the project.
- To review findings and results from step 3 across all the groups.

- *To plan outreach activities to step 5.*

Enabling Conditions:

- *Draft reports from different project groups are widely circulated so that groups can learn from each other.*
- *Many participants from the working teams debate the results in meetings prior to the national workshop.*

Process & Activities:

- *Conduct a national workshop.*
- *Include ways to share draft reports among the many groups.*
- *Check on progress of each group.*
- *Support integration across the groups.*
- *Use workshop activities to design the work to be conducted in step 5.*

Step 5: Support adoption of the strategies through outreach.

Goals for This Step:

- *To secure public support and cooperation for the project and the strategies.*
- *To engage policy makers, government, and conservation organizations in adopting the strategies.*

Enabling Conditions:

- *Documentation of findings and recommendations are circulated so that the project results can be shared with stakeholders, decision makers, the broader conservation community, and the general public.*
- *Multiple networks are involved in the process of disseminating the results so that exposure is maximized and opportunities for further support are created.*
- *A program of environmental education strategies and specific outreach goals is established so that the strategies will be adopted.*

Process & activities:

- *Hold national and/or international workshops to highlight the main findings and bring them to the attention of the broader scientific community, government, and the public.*
- *Publish the findings in a book and through specific articles in a range of media.*
- *Involve key policy makers, government and conservation organization in both the steering group and the project to maintain a sense of ownership and commitment to an on-going process.*
- *Encourage steering group members to get involved in regional - and national - level government task forces to promote action based on the information, priorities, and policy issues uncovered, and to promote more in-depth exercises in their specific regions.*
- *Make a strong commitment to conduct periodic reviews of priorities.*

Source: Linking Macro and Micro: Setting Conservation Priorities the BCPP Way. 2000. World Wildlife Fund. Washington DC

ANNEX - 9: Conducting a Stakeholder Analysis

Conducting a Stakeholder Analysis

In order to determine who should possibly be involved or might want to be involved, the following questions can be asked:

- Who is/might be interested in or affected by the thematic area?
- What are their interests and positions?
- Who has information and expertise that might be helpful?
- Who has been/is involved in similar initiatives or planning?
- Who has expressed interest in being involved in similar initiatives/efforts before?
- Who else might be interested in contributing to the NCSA?

A simplified table for categorizing stakeholders, which may assist with the stakeholder analysis, is shown below. After identifying stakeholders, their interests, etc., it may be helpful to divide stakeholders into four categories: those who will likely want to participate fully or whose active involvement will determine the credibility of the process; those who would likely play a more limited role; those who likely will wish simply to be kept well informed; and those who will not want to be involved. This categorization may help with organizational matters.

| <i>Who? Stakeholder Name</i> | <i>What? Stakeholder Interests, Position & Official Mandate</i> | <i>Why? Reasons for Inclusion</i> | <i>How? Possible Role</i> |
|--------------------------------------|---|---|-----------------------------------|
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |

Source: UNDP/GEF 2001

ANNEX - 10: Capacity Constraints Matrix

| <i>Capacity Constraints Matrix</i> | | | |
|--|--|---|--------------------------------------|
| <p>Once capacity constraints are identified, they can be charted below under the appropriate categories of individual, institutional and systemic capacity constraints. This matrix may help to organize the categorization of capacity constraints identified which, in turn, may facilitate the identification of related opportunities for capacity building (undertaken in the next step).</p> | | | |
| <i>Priority Issues</i> | <i>Individual Capacity Constraints</i> | <i>Institutional Capacity Constraints</i> | <i>Systemic Capacity Constraints</i> |
| - <u>Issue 1</u> : vulnerability and adaptation | - ... | - ... | - ... |
| - <u>Issue 2</u> : awareness and understanding of climate issues | - ... | - ... | - ... |
| - <u>Issue 3</u> : ... | | | |
| - <u>Issue 4</u> : ... | | | |

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